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Preface 
Fostering of inclusive business is a recent approach to alleviate poverty in 
developing countries. Inclusive business is to be understood as sustainable and 
commercially viable business that involves low-income communities in value 
chains, in such a way that is benefitting them. NGOs develop inclusive business 
in public-private partnerships with firms that have interests in reliable local 
supply. In such partnerships, there are issues to be solved, such as the high 
transaction costs for firms sourcing from large numbers of small-scale 
suppliers, the cost of logistics, the firms’ trust in the suppliers’ capacity and 
commitment to the relationship, the suppliers’ trust that firms will accept their 
produce and will pay as promised, and the availability of knowledge, capital, 
and inputs to the suppliers. NGOs and firms are assumed to have 
complementary capacities and resources to solve these issues. 
 
New impact assessment approaches are required to evaluate public-private 
partnerships aiming at supply chain development. Topics to be measured 
include changes in farm income and transaction costs , as well as behavioural 
change in value chain relationships. This report concerns the development of a 
value chain laboratory (VC-Lab) for impact assessment of supply development 
programmes. The VC-Lab developed an operational methodology and progress 
assessment tool that permits the measurement of behavioural change and 
scenario development in vertically structured supply-chain relationships. For 
this purpose, we used a participative gaming approach that identifies changes 
in mutual trust, transaction costs and risk behaviour that result from VC 
support. Within the framework of the VC-Lab, the agent-based simulations 
compare potential performance with outcomes from actual value chain 
participants, thus following the symbiotic gaming and agent-based simulation 
interaction as proposed by Tykhonov et al. (2008). Thus, an environment is 
offered where data can be gathered, hypotheses about cooperative processes 
can be tested, and alternative regimes can be experimented with. 
 
The research is conducted in the context of a programme called 2SCALE 
(Towards Sustainable Clusters in Agribusiness through Learning in 
Entrepreneurship) that is developed in sub-Sahara Africa. The goal of 2SCALE 
is to improve rural livelihoods and food and nutrition security in nine African 
countries. To this end 2SCALE forges public-private partnerships, with private 
partners varying from local producer organisations and SMEs to large-scale 
companies such as seed companies, processors, and trading companies. The 
approach is based on (1) formation of agribusiness clusters - local networks 
between the producers themselves and with service providers - to improve 
competitive intelligence and bargaining power, (2) integrating the agribusiness 
clusters in value chains, with backward linkages to input supply chains and 
forward linkages to food supply chains, and (3) enabling fair business 
environments with better access to information and finance, in particular for 
the weaker actors.  
 
This report describes the VC-Lab and agent-based simulation of the 
assessment of two 2SCALE initiatives: (i) sorghum value chain in Meru County, 
Kenya and (ii) soybean value chain in Tamale, Ghana. The study provides 
insights into the trust levels of farmers, their risk perception and collective 
action strategies, and provides scenarios for maximal impact. Data gathering 
and analyses took place in 2015 and 2016.  
 
We trust that the findings of this study will help to strengthen the design and 
evaluation of future VC projects and will inform current and future debates on 
inclusive and sustainable value chain development initiatives. We are greatly 
indebted to the farmers for their assistance and the information they have 
provided us. We express our gratitude towards Shalem for their commitment 
and collaboration to provide the researchers will all the necessary information 
and logistical arrangements. We would not have been able to conduct this 
study without their efforts. We also wish to thank the IFDC team in Ghana and 
Kenya. They assisted us during the whole process and provided us with all the 
necessary information. We sincerely hope that this report provides a relevant 
reference for field staff and stakeholders involved.  
 
The Hague, July 2017 
 
 
Prof.dr.ir. J.A.G.J. (Jack) van der Vorst 
General Director Social Sciences Group (SSG) 
Wageningen University & Research 
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Summary 
This study was conducted in the context of the 2SCALE (Towards Sustainable 
Clusters in Agribusiness through Learning in Entrepreneurship) programme 
running from 2012-2017. The programme is inclusive in character and aims to 
improve rural livelihoods and food and nutrition security in nine sub-Saharan 
African countries and is implemented by a three-member consortium: the 
International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC), Base of the Pyramid 
Innovation Center (BoPInc.) and the International Centre for development 
oriented Research in Agriculture (ICRA). The programme is supported by a 
grant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. To this end 2SCALE 
forges public-private partnerships, with private partners varying from local 
producer organisations and SMEs to large-scale companies such as seed 
companies, processors, and trading companies.  
 
The intervention strategy of 2SCALE, i.e. fostering of inclusive business aiming 
to involve low-income communities in value chains, is based on a novel 
approach to alleviate poverty in developing countries. The approach also 
requires new impact assessment tools to measure change in farm income and 
transaction costs , as well as behavioural change in value chain relationships. 
Current impact assessment approaches face challenges for analysing typical 
value chain interfaces, where multiple stakeholders are usually involved that 
pursue different - sometimes even opposing - interests and objectives, and 
that have to operate within a dynamic (inter)national market environment. In 
such settings, conventional impact assessments only offer partial insight and 
sometimes even draw inadequate conclusions, overlooking important 
behavioural responses and disregarding market interaction effects that may 
lead to different outcomes. Therefore this study focuses on role and changes in 
horizontal cooperation and vertical relations of the value chain including trust, 
loyalty and behavioural change. This study thus aimed to design an alternative 
impact assessment tool..  
 
As such, the aim of the VC-Lab is twofold:  
I) To develop an innovative operational methodology and progress 
assessment tool that permits the measurement of behavioural change in 
vertically structured value chain relationships 
II) To apply the methodology to two cases of the 2SCALE programme to 
assess changes in relations between the main actors which can be 
contributed to 2SCALE interventions.  
 
Within the 2SCALE programme, a Theory of Change (see Appendix 1) was 
developed that underpins the market transformation interventions’ logic and its 
assumptions. The intervention logic is based on three elements: risk 
perception, mutual trust and transaction costs s. The selection of these three 
key variables is based on theoretical insights regarding agency behaviour. The 
adoption of good agricultural production practices (GAP) and good business 
practices (GBP) are commonly understood as investment decisions that require 
capital and labour resources and access to knowledge, information and 
training. These investment decisions are mainly guided by perceived risk 
(Barham et al. 2014; Feder et al. 1985). The collaboration and compliance 
relations within supply chains are considered to be largely determined by 
mutual trust between value chain partners (Laeequddin et al. 2010; Kwon and 
Suh 2005). Loyalties in deliveries (i.e. contract compliance) as well as control 
on free-riding and opportunistic behaviour (side sales) are key factors for 
optimal capacity utilisation in processing, storage and trade. Procurement 
relationships between value chain partners and the added value generation in 
the supply chain are largely governed by transaction costs s. Investments in 
quality upgrading are facilitated by reduced transaction costs s for search, 
negotiation and control (Hobbs 1996). Contracts that reinforce reciprocity and 
reduce default options (simplified compliance) provide a governance structure 
that reinforces quality compliance. Transaction attributes (such as scale and 
frequency) and clear contracting rules (specified quality standards; payment 
systems) permit to reduce search and supervision costs and thus optimise 
value chain outcomes. 
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Figure S.1 Methodology of the VC-Lab  
 
The VC-Lab assesses the effects of 2SCALE on the VC relationships and 
performance outcomes. The VC-Lab is designed as a responsive assessment 
and learning framework for analysing behavioural impact of supply chain 
support programmes. The VC-Lab consists of 3 components (see also 
figure 1):  
 Value Chain Analysis (VCA);  
 Value Chain Games (VCG) involving participating farmers and non-
participating farmers; 
 Multi-Agent Simulation Model (ABM). 
 
In consultation with management of 2SCALE two cases were selected for this 
study. Both were public-private partnerships, which were supported by the 
programme: i) sorghum produced around Meru (Kenya) for the beer industry 
with a dedicated buyer and ii) soy produced in Northern Ghana for the oil 
industry supplied to multiple buyers through a cooperative structure. For each 
case a specific VC-Lab was designed according to the value chain logic, its 
actors and the specific intervention logic of 2SCALE. The two cases are not 
comparable in the sense that the value chain structure and the approach of 
2SCALE are different between the two countries.  
 
Data of the value chain analysis were collected in November and December 
2015 via interviews of stakeholders, focus group discussions and desk study. 
The games were conducted in December 2015 in Ghana and in June 2016 in 
Kenya. In total three games were played: a risk game, the trust game and a 
group trust/collective action game. The games were played with participants 
(treatment group) and non-participants of the 2SCALE intervention 
(comparison group). In total 256 farmers in Ghana participated in the games 
and 240 in Kenya. The model was developed during the whole period. The 
results were validated and further discussed at a dissemination workshop in 
Kenya in May 2017. The ABM is accessible online and available for IFCD and 
partners and Shalem in Kenya.  
 
The conclusions are drawn at two levels: the validity of the methodology 
developed and the empirical effects of the intervention in the two case studies. 
Value chain mapping &  
desk research 
Games (trust, risk and 
group behaviour) 
Agent-based modelling 
Results on trust, risk and 
group behaviour 
Simulation of future 
impact 
Input for design and policy of 
inclusive and sustainable business 
Input for refinement of VC-Lab to 
measure impact & behavioural change  
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Concerning the methodology, the VC-Lab proves to be a promising approach 
for measuring and evaluating the key assumptions of behavioural change 
specifically related to trust and risk. The VC-Lab is validated as an assessment 
and learning method for analysing behavioural impact of supply chain support 
programmes. The three steps (value chain analysis, games and the agent-
based model) follow a logical sequence and are crucial methodological 
components of the lab. Each step provided important data for the design and 
customisation of the next step. It appeared though that it is important to 
gather data over time for some parameters (e.g. trust and risk attitude) and 
that sufficient resources need to be available to gather those data via games. 
Another challenge was found in the concretisation of transaction costs. The VC-
Lab generated valuable insights for further methodological development. One 
recommendation for improvement is to include a parameter of decision making 
of agents regarding the trade-offs between the cultivation of other crops than 
those under study, taking into consideration weather and changes in market 
prices. Another important experience is that not all value chain cases are 
suitable for a VC-Lab and ABM. The Ghana case was less suitable as there are 
multiple farmer groups and various buyers of their produce. As such, there are 
different alternative value chains and exchange relations may endure for one 
season only. 
 
Concerning the 2SCALE intervention in Ghana and Kenya, it can be concluded 
that the programme contributed to trust development over time. Overall, the 
farmers participating in the 2SCALE programme show higher levels of trust in 
their regular buyers and also compared to non-participating farmers. We can 
confirm that repeated interactions between value chain agents has reinforced 
inter-agent trust over time. In addition, we identified a positive trust uptake 
after a positive experience and negative trust uptake after a negative 
experience. It also illustrates that resources must be spent on trust building 
and trustworthiness and that it takes a lot of efforts to maintain or increase 
trust beyond a certain level. An important outcome of the VC-lab is that it is 
crucial to offer producers training on good agricultural practices and that 
simultaneously increase quality and quantity of the produce and increase trust.  
 
However, we did not observe major differences in group behaviour between 
farmers who are part of the intervention and farmers who are not: free riding 
is common practice in all farmer groups. Also, risk aversion is very high and 
does not show any difference between farmers in or outside the intervention 
group. Common attitude against risk is mainly averse although relations seems 
to be improving; when formal (contractual) arrangements are in place, trust 
has increased. It also appears that selling part of the produce to another party 
than the main buyer with contractual arrangement will always be part of the 
experience of the VC. Even if all conditions are favourable (i.e. high price 
offered, produce of high quality, guaranteed market, training on agricultural 
skills offered), it appears that side-selling may occur. The reasons are 
legitimate and have nothing to do with trust, risk or disloyalty. It is just a 
matter of urgent need of cash. As long as producers do not have any savings 
or cannot access loans, it is reasonable to argue that side-selling will occur.  
 
Concerning the interventions of 2SCALE in Kenya and Ghana, the overall 
conclusions are that: 
 It turns out to be crucial for a stable contractual delivery to provide a stable 
and high contract price against uncertain alternatives;  
 Improving skills leads to increased production and higher volumes;  
 Horizontal and vertical trust are a key success factors for expanding 
production and exchange;  
 A (good) reputation and trustworthiness are crucial for an effective VC with 
strong linkages and relationships;  
 The approach of 2Scale can lead to improved farm income and a profitable 
processor. 
 
More specifically per country, the tables A and B provide a summary of the 
evaluation results:  
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Table S.1  Main conclusions Kenya  
Kenya main results on 2SCALE intervention  
Trust of farmers is higher in Shalem (processor of intervention) compared to a) other 
processors and brokers and b) to farmers of comparison group which is a positive result of 
Shalem and IFDC interventions. Trust in Shalem caused by trustworthiness, offering a good 
price and training on production. 
Risk aversion is high and equally high among farmers in the treatment and comparison group. 
It is crucial for a stable contract supply to provide stable and high contract price against 
uncertain alternative. 
Improving skills leads to increased sorghum production and volumes and builds trust. 
(Good) Reputation and trustworthiness crucial for sustainable, inclusive and effective value 
chain. 
Approach IFDC can lead to higher farm incomes and profitable processor. Trust is key success 
factor. 
Shalem sorghum case is suitable for VC-Lab approach. 
Table S.2  Main conclusions Ghana  
Ghana main results on 2SCALE intervention  
No differences VCM game: free riding and investing in common pool resources. Low trust 
levels in other group members and negative behaviour of peers affects individual behaviour.  
Risk aversion is high and equally high among farmers in the treatment and comparison group. 
A positive relation between production loan, trust & attitude towards group leadership and risk 
aversion. 
If prices cannot be stabilised by price support or contracts offering a good minimum price, 
collective storage and development of small-scale local processing can be good alternatives, 
provided that good inputs are available. 
Ghana soy case is less suitable for VC-Lab approach. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Fostering of inclusive business is a recent approach to alleviate poverty in 
developing countries. Inclusive business is to be understood as sustainable and 
commercially viable business that involves low-income communities in value 
chains, in a way that is benefitting them. NGOs develop inclusive business in 
public-private partnerships with firms that have interests in reliable local 
supply. In such partnerships, there are issues to be solved such as the high 
transaction costs for firms sourcing from large numbers of poor suppliers, the 
cost of logistics, the firms’ trust in the suppliers’ capacity and commitment to 
the relationship, the suppliers’ trust that firms will accept their produce and 
pay as promised, and the availability of knowledge, capital, and inputs to the 
suppliers. NGOs and firms are assumed to have complementary capacities and 
resources to solve these issues. 
 
Therefore the 2SCALE (Towards Sustainable Clusters in Agribusiness through 
Learning in Entrepreneurship) programme has been developed. This is a 
consortium of partners, led by the International Fertilizer Development Center 
(IFDC), and included the Base-of-the-Pyramid Innovation Centre (BoP Inc.) 
and the International Centre for development-oriented Research in Agriculture 
(ICRA). The programme is supported by a grant of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (through the Directorate-General for International Cooperation, DGIS) 
of the Netherlands. The programme runs from 2012 to 2017.  
 
The approach in this programme is based on: 
 Formation of agribusiness clusters - local networks between the producers 1.
themselves and with service providers - to improve competitive intelligence 
and bargaining power; 
 Integrating the agribusiness clusters in VCs, with backward linkages to 2.
input supply chains and forward linkages to food supply chains; 
 Enabling fair business environments with better access to information and 3.
finance, in particular for the weaker actors.  
 
New impact assessment approaches are required to evaluate public-private 
partnerships aiming at supply development and inclusive value chains. Topics 
to be measured include changes in farm income and transaction costs, trust 
and behavioural change in value chain relationships. An impact study using the 
Difference in Difference approach (DID) is conducted by another party 
(Research Solutions Africa – RSA - in collaboration with the American Institute 
for Research - AIR). This impact study focusses on the robust impact, i.e. 
impact at household level to assess welfare changes on the producer level. The 
present study focussed on effects of and changes in horizontal and vertical 
relations of the value chain including trust, loyalty and behavioural change.  
 
In a free market situation, buyer to seller trust is important, but in a value 
chain it is even more important, because it concerns direct trading partners, 
not only now, but in the direct future. In contrast to what is called vertical 
integration, supply chain actors are not integrated in the same company or 
work under the same management. Most actors are independent, but trade 
with each other based on formal agreements such as contracts, and informal 
agreements, such as trust. If farmers do not comply with their formal contract 
and for example deliver to other buyers or on the open market, we call this 
side-selling. Reasons for side-selling are numerous, but this can be mainly 
related to a low trust level or a lack of loyalty towards their usual buyer.  
 
The research has therefore developed a value chain laboratory (VC-Lab) for 
impact assessment of supply development programmes. The VC-Lab entails 
three steps: i) value chain mapping and analysis; ii) participatory games on 
the main indicators here i.e. trust and risk; and iii) an agent-based model. The 
latter mirrors the games with actual value chain participants, following the 
symbiotic gaming and agent-based simulation approach as proposed by 
Tykhonov et al. (2008). Thus, with the VC-Lab an environment is offered 
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where data can be gathered, hypotheses about the processes can be tested, 
and alternative regimes can be experimented with. 
 
Since a responsive assessment and learning framework for analysing 
behavioural impact of supply chain support programmes is missing we 
developed a new tool, which is developed alongside two 2SCALE cases: 1) 
Sorghum produced around Meru (Kenya) for the beer industry with a dedicated 
buyer and 2) soy produced in Tamale (Northern Ghana) for among others the 
oil industry supplied through various cooperatives and farmer organisations.  
1.2 Objective  
This study has the following objectives: 
 To assess the effects of 2SCALE support on value chain relationships and 
performance outcomes; 
 To provide feedback to 2SCALE programme management and partners 
concerning the outcome and output effects of VC support programmes; 
 To identify and support potential improvements in VC support; 
 To design and validate the VC-Lab as an assessment and learning method for 
analysing behavioural impact of supply chain support programmes.  
1.3 Approach  
The project developed a Value Chain Lab (VC-Lab) that supports the 
understanding of the key behavioural assumptions and will help to assess 
changes in the agency VC relationships due to 2SCALE.  
 
The VC-Lab is a responsive assessment and learning framework for analysing 
behavioural impact of supply chain support programmes. The VC-Lab consists 
of 3 tools: Value Chain Analysis (VCA), Value Chain Games (VCG) and a multi-
agent Simulation Model. In addition, some key indicators from the impact 
study of ARS and AIR have been used as input for this study. 
 
Together with 2SCALE, the following of their ongoing public-private 
partnerships were cases in this study:  
 Sorghum produced around Meru town (Kenya) for the Beer industry with a 
dedicated buyer.  
 Soy produced in Northern Ghana for the oil industry supplied to a 
cooperative.  
 New potato varieties supplied by a nucleus farm aimed at supplying the 
processing industry (Ethiopia). 
 
The potato interventions in Ethiopia faced serious challenges due to political 
unrest; the stock potatoes were devastated in heavy fire started by protestors 
in December 2015. Work of numerous years of multiplication/selection of new 
potato varieties was destroyed. Because of this issue, the project continued 
only with the sorghum and soy cases. This VCA is described in Appendix 2.  
1.4 Reading guide  
This report gives an overview of the relevant literature and conceptual 
framework in Chapter 2 and methodology applied (Chapter 3). This is followed 
by the results of the VC-Labs in Kenya (Chapter 4) and in Ghana (Chapter in 
5). In Chapter 6 the main conclusions are presented. 
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Point of departure: trust, risk and transaction costs in 
value chains 
2.1 The Theory of Change  
The VC-Lab approach is based on the theory of change (ToC) that underpins 
2SCALE support to market transformations (Figure 3.2). It focuses attention on 
the verification of key assumptions underlying the VC change pathways 
(instead of measuring only nominal changes in outcomes).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Theory of change that underpins the 2scale support to market 
transformation 
 
 
The selection of these three key variables is based on available theoretical 
insights on agency behaviour. The adoption of good agricultural practices 
(GAP) and good business practices (GBP) is commonly understood as an 
investment decision that requires capital and labour resources and 
knowledge/training. The adoption of GAP/GBP is mainly guided by risk 
perceptions (which in turn may be influenced by their risk attitudes) (Barham 
et al. 2014; Feder et al. 1985). 2SCALE support thus intends to influence the 
mental model (e.g. willingness to invest and willingness to collaborate) of and 
the social interactions (e.g. knowledge diffusion) between VC agents. Gender, 
age, education, farm size, wealth and proximity to the market are usually 
differentiating variables for risky decision making, i.e. influencing the 
anticipated uptake of improved practices. The analysis can distinguish between 
risk perceptions for particular types of practices, thus anticipating the likely 
uptake by specific categories of producers. 
 
Design for the methodology applied follows the value chain (VC) structure and 
dynamics that govern the interactions amongst value chain agents. These 
interactions are guided by price and non-price commitments. While the price 
commitments result in net (expected) value added that each of the agents can 
capture from the transaction, the non-price elements are of vital importance 
for the exchange of information between the agents (e.g. commitment, 
reliability and trust) and the behaviour of the agents (e.g. quality compliance, 
loyalty in deliveries, etc.). These aspects determine the transaction costs s in 
the value chain and tend to guide the decisions on input use, technology choice 
and market outlet choice. 
 
In a free market situation, buyer to seller trust is important, but in a value 
chain it is even more important, because it concerns direct trading partners, 
not only now, but in the direct future. In contrast to what is called vertical 
integration, supply chain actors are not integrated in the same company or 
work under the same management. Most actors are independent, but trade 
with each other is based on formal agreements such as contracts, and informal 
agreements, such as trust. Such collaboration and compliance relations within 
value chains are considered to be largely determined by mutual trust between 
VC partners (Laeequddin et al. 2009; Kwon and Suh 2005). 
 
2Scale & 
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Loyalty in deliveries (contract compliance) and control on free-riding and 
opportunistic behaviour (side sales) are key factors for capacity utilisation in 
processing, storage and trade. If farmers do not comply with their formal 
contract and for example sell to other buyers or on the open market, we call 
this side-selling. Reasons for side-selling are numerous, but this can be mostly 
related to a low trust level or a lack of loyalty towards their usual buyer. 
Committed and collaborative relationships between value chain partners are 
based on mutual trust. If trust is present, it can increase the likelihood of 
successful value chain deliveries (reduced moral hazards) and improved value 
chain performance (reliable and timeliness of deliveries).  
 
Procurement relationships between value chain partners and the added value 
generation in the value chain bring transaction costs s. Contracts that reinforce 
reciprocity and reduce default options (simplified compliance) provide a 
governance structure that reinforces quality compliance. Transaction attributes 
(such as scale, frequency) and clear contracting rules (specified quality 
standards; payment systems) permit to reduce search and supervision costs 
and thus lead to improved VC outcomes (Hobbs 1996). 
2.2 Inclusion in the theory of change 
For smallholder farmers, especially in low and middle income countries, it is a 
challenge to be included in the value chains. Inclusion means a large 
opportunity for them. They can have access to financial and agronomic inputs, 
and have more economic certainty due to more and stable buyers. However, 
the quality of the product is often a barrier to inclusion, as the smallholders 
lack the means and skills to produce the required quality (Lee et al. 2012). 
Contracts are therefore often used as a means to enforce loyalty and 
commitment, to motivate farmers to comply with minimum quality and 
quantity requirements. Various incentives can be included into those contracts 
such as an improved selling price or access to improved inputs. 
 
For a successful inclusion of smallholder farmers in the global value chain, trust 
is a key factor. Farmers’ trust in a new partner, as well as reciprocal trust of 
the buyer in the farmers is important. Entering a global value chain and getting 
access to a larger market does not automatically increase these trust levels. 
On the short run it can even decrease them, because the trading partners do 
not yet know each other and often a (large) difference exists in size of trading 
partners. When Ethiopian sesame farmers started to trade with traders of 
formal networks, with whom they did not have social relations, their trust 
levels were initially lower than when dealing with informal networks (Siziba and 
Bulte, 2012). So trust can eventually lead to better market participation, but in 
the short run this is not necessary the case and it may even run the other way 
around. That is why vertical exchange contracts that enable and reinforce trust 
between farmers and their VC buyers is a first central focus in this research. 
 
Producer organisations or farmer groups that congregate and represent 
farmers, often called cooperatives or associations, are institutes that can help 
to overcome quality and trust barriers in order to become included in the 
chain. By being involved in cooperatives, farmers can exchange information on 
agricultural techniques, and together they have more means to access 
agricultural and financial inputs. They develop a stronger bargaining position 
towards their buyers. Cooperatives as such can be included in a value chain, 
and compete with larger farmers and agribusiness (Stockbridge et al. 2003). 
But being congregated and included in a value chain is not enough. Again, 
mutual trust is essential. In this case, trust of farmers in each other, so mutual 
trust as well as trust in other actors and institutions in charge of (the 
management of) the cooperative / group is very important. That is why 
horizontal cooperation and trust between farmers of the same cooperative is a 
second central focus in this research. 
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Simulating impact via the Value Chain Laboratory 
3.1 Introduction  
The VC-Lab provides an interactive assessment and learning framework for 
analysing behavioural impact developed alongside the 2SCALE intervention in 
Kenya and Ghana. The VC-Lab consists of three phases: 
 
 The first step is a Value Chain Analysis (VCA) in order to understand the 1.
structure of the value chain, to identify all value chain stakeholders (from 
input suppliers to final consumers) and to analyse stakeholder group size 
and composition, key resources (assets), objectives of stakeholders and key 
chain dynamics.  
 The second phase is the development of a VC game with real-life VC 2.
partners which are observed in a repeated game, i.e. a multi-season 
setting, actual VC decision making as a result of risk perception, personal 
and group trust. The results of the games are presented as outcomes of the 
intervention and as parameter for the ABM (step 3).  
 The third phase of the VC-Lab is the development of a multi-agent VC 3.
simulation tool (ABM). In this tool the behavioural characteristics of the VC 
agents, as derived from the VC game, the VCA and literature, will be 
captured as ‘what-if’ rules in the VC simulation model. The VC simulation 
model allows for the exploration of alternative value chain options at plot 
level (e.g. alternative contracts or alternative incentive mechanisms). 
 
The results of the games and the simulations in the ABM provide insights to 
further design and improve the intervention of 2SCALE and similar 
programmes aiming to improve the inclusive value chains. In addition, the 
results provide input for further development and refinement of the 
methodology of the VC-Lab to measure and simulate impact of certain 
interventions (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Visualisation of the VC-Lab  
 
 
An impact study to measure the impacts of the 2SCALE intervention out 
household level was conducted by Research Solutions Africa (RSA) in 
collaboration with American Institutes for Research (AIR). A difference-in-
difference approach is applied conducting household surveys. The baseline 
results were shared by RSA/AIR and used in our study. The impact study will 
be conducted end 2017 and therefore these final impact results are not 
available at the publication of this report.  
The Value Chain Analysis  
The value chain analysis (VCA) is the first step of the VC-Lab approach. For all 
three public private partnerships we organised a 5-day field mission in order to 
map the VC. During the mission the relevant key VC actors were visited. These 
were farmers, traders, input suppliers, and various service providers: 
 For the sessions with the farmers we used a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
approach and the meetings took place without presence of IFDC. See 
Steward and Shamdasani (1990) for more information on the theory and 
practice of conducting FGDs.  
Value chain 
mapping & desk 
Games (trust, risk and 
group behaviour) 
Agent-based modelling
Results on trust, risk 
and group behaviour
Simulation of future 
impact 
Input for design and policy 
of inclusive and sustainable 
business 
Input for refinement of VC-
Lab to measure impact & 
behavioural change  
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 With other stakeholders (e.g. IFDC staff, extension workers, input suppliers, 
transporters, banks, processors, traders) we organised semi-structured 
interviews. For each interview we used a guideline with the topics to be 
discussed.  
  
Important topics of both the FGD and the interviews were trust, risk, the role 
of contracts (formal and informal) and how the perceived transaction costs s. 
During the FGDs and the interviews translation was done by an independent 
enumerator. For every mission an intensive mission report was compiled.  
 
Prior to the field mission, we conducted a desk review in order to understand 
the sectors and their dynamics. We reviewed literature and consulted 
additional data sources in order to collect secondary data on the sectors. This 
included production statistics but also, if available, figures on cost prices and 
production seasons.  
The Value Chain Games 
Experimental economics offers methods to test many behavioural hypotheses 
and behavioural experiments have begun to demonstrate the importance of 
testing the standard assumptions made about decision-makers (Cardenas and 
Carpenter 2008). An experiment is considered as a potential research method 
when the necessary information concerns inter- or intrapersonal behavioural 
attitudes and when this information suffers from hypothetical of self-serving 
bias (Van Kempen 2009). The information gathered is about the behavioural 
attitudes trust, reciprocity, cooperation and risk aversion. The experiments 
were conducted to avoid hypothetical and socially desired answers as much as 
possible. For this reason, the games were played with real money and every 
participant gained a certain amount of money while playing the games. The 
main advantage of experimental games is incentive-compatibility (Hurwicz 
1972). Incentives are set in such a way that it is optimal for rational individuals 
to truthfully reveal private information which means that self-serving 
behaviour is costly. 
 
In this study we used three behavioural economic games which were 
customised to the Kenyan and Ghana context: 
 The trust game (Berg et al. 1995); 1.
 Risk preference game using paired lottery (Holt and Laury 2002); 2.
 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) game to measure group trust 3.
(Andreoni 1995). 
 
The trust game is played in pairs, the risk preference game is played 
individually and the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism as a group. 
 
Trust game  
In the trust game, a first and a second mover send each other money or 
tokens that represent a monetary value. The first mover, one of the farmers in 
the game, receives an amount of money from the game leader to use in a 
single game. The amount of tokens that the first mover sends is tripled by the 
game leader before it reaches an anonymous second mover. After this, the 
second mover can choose how much he or she sends back to the same (but 
anonymous) first mover. This return is not tripled, and this procedure is 
explained to everyone. Since both players are anonymous, the Nash 
equilibrium for a single round trust game is that nothing is sent by the first 
mover, because the second mover has no incentive to return anything. But the 
trust in the good intentions of the second mover (the trustee), and so a 
positive expectation of the return can make the first mover (the trustor) decide 
to send a fraction of his or her game money to his or her matched but 
unknown partner. The social optimum is that the first mover sends 100% to 
the second mover, and the second mover returns half of the received money 
(Berg et al. 1995). The revealed trust is measured as the fraction of the 
playing money or tokens, which is sent to the second mover. This will be a 
value between 0 and 1. Trustworthiness is measured as the fraction that the 
second mover returns from his or her received money.  
 
This game was chosen to be included in the VC game, because it is simple 
enough to play with illiterate farmers, and is considered a better measurement 
than a questionnaire which has a risk of socially desired answers. A 
disadvantage of this game is it is hard to determine if we measured pure trust, 
or other regarding preferences, such as altruism, or inequality aversion (Cox 
2004).  
 
The outcomes of the trust game are likely to change if a one round game is 
transformed to a multi round game. Reciprocity, patience, and relation building 
will then become important. Personal characteristics such as risk attitude and 
initial trust levels, but also the way a one round game is played influences the 
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behaviour in a multi round game (Davis et al. 2015). The major change is that 
the role of unconditional kindness is reduced, and reciprocity is the main factor 
that determines what the players send to each other. A previous experiment in 
which a multi-round trust game was used shows that the endowment in a 
second or later rounds heavily depend on the reciprocity showed in the 
previous round (King-Casas et al. 2005). 
 
Risk preference game  
In the risk preference game we used the multiple price list method as designed 
by Holt and Laury (2002). Participants can choose between a risky option, and 
a certainty equivalent to determine their risk preference. A multiple price list 
was used with six choices between option A, ‘win a certain amount of money’, 
or option B: ‘flip a coin’ (head means winning an amount of money, tail means 
winning nothing). The amounts were customised proposed per countries. The 
risk preference game was played individually.  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism  
The most common group trust game is the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
(VCM). In this game, players can contribute a fraction (ranging from 0 to 
100%) of their playing money to a public account. The rest is stocked in a 
private account. Typically, the public amount is then doubled or tripled. The 
players earn what is left on their private account, and an equal share the public 
pot account. In this game it can be tempting to ‘free ride’, but in a social 
optimum everything is stored on the public account (Croson et al. 2005). This 
game was played to measure cooperative behaviour, and the trust in the 
group, of all the players.  
 
The trust game, the risk preference game and the group trust game were 
played with randomly selected farmer groups participating in the 2Scale 
programme (treatment group) and where possible compared with comparable 
farmers who did not participate in the programme (control group) (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1 Number of farmer groups involved in the games  
 Treatment Control Total
Kenya 10 5 15
Ghana 11 5 16
Total 21 10 31
Selection of farmers  
In Kenya the sorghum agent contacted the farmer group leader by phone to 
arrange the selected farmers and a venue. The research team randomly 
recruited 15 farmers from the member list to participate in the games with an 
additional 9 farmers as back-up. 
  
In Ghana the games were played with randomly selected farmer groups in the 
area of the 2SCALE programme. IFDC selected the farmer groups, based on a 
list of famer groups and member names. A farmer group consist of 
approximately 50 persons and only when organised in such a group, farmers 
can apply for a production loan. In such a group, interpersonal trust is 
essential, because the default of one of the members affects all of them. Every 
session was played with 16 people, so within the larger groups there was a 
random selection to select participants.  
 
After the games, a debriefing questionnaire was filled out by the farmers to 
obtain gender and age, and ask if they were eligible for a production loan in 
the last season. Besides, in this debriefing participants were asked to rank 
their trust in the group, and their trust in the leadership in a Likert Scale from 
1-5. At the end, all farmers were paid the amount they had won in the games. 
Multi-agent Simulation Model 
In order to capture the value chain interactions, impact analysis should be 
based on interactive approaches that are able to reveal behavioural drivers and 
constraints for value chain coordination. The experiments which were 
explained in the previous paragraphs are supported by agent-based modelling 
(ABM) to assess possible alternative outcomes (Tykhonov et al. 2008). This 
approach allows for a detailed assessment of existing systems, and ex-ante 
assessment of potential future options, which is either impossible or 
impractically expensive with other approaches. We calibrate our simulation 
model with primary data collected by ourselves and with detailed household 
data of the baseline study of RSA/AIR to simulate the functioning of the two 
selected value chains. 
 
The objective of the ABM is to evaluate the value chain development project 
with respect to the role of trust and opportunities to hedge risk and reduce 
transaction costs. Agent-based models are a kind of microscale model that 
simulates the simultaneous operations and interactions of multiple agents in an 
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attempt to re-create and predict the appearance of complex phenomena. The 
process is one of emergence from the lower (micro) level of systems to a 
higher (macro) level. As such, a key notion is that simple behavioural rules 
generate complex behaviour. The ABM is implemented as a computer 
simulation using NetLogo and it is used to test how changes in individual 
behaviour will affect the system’s emerging overall behaviour. As such, the 
agent-based model is applicable to the intervention of 2SCALE were 
sustainable long term relations, linkages and mutual trust is to be established. 
Within the model the impact can be estimated of the underlying but also of 
alternative intervention strategies. As such, the model can aid in decreasing 
failure costs of interventions.  
 
The multi-agent simulation model was developed for each intervention to 
simulate decision making at various stages of the agricultural value chain. Data 
from the games and data from the baseline survey conducted by ARS/AIR was 
used as input for the model in addition to data of the VCA and literature. 
Virtual agents are created with characteristics (role, type of production, 
production or processing capacity) that resemble the real-life agents in the 
game session. In the concept of the value chain laboratory, the agent-based 
simulations mirror simulation games with actual value chain participants, 
following the symbiotic gaming and agent-based simulation approach as 
proposed by Tykhonov et al. (2008). Thus, an environment is offered where 
data can be gathered, hypotheses about the processes can be tested, and 
alternative regimes can be experimented with. 
3.2 Timeline  
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the activities per country and the VC-Lab 
project phases. Activities started in Kenya with a field mission in order to 
conduct the VCA. Directly after that a VCA mission to Ethiopia was organised, 
at the same time political unrest intensified and potato stock for the treatment 
group was destroyed. As a result the VC-Lab continued only with the 
interventions in Kenya and Ghana.  
 
Table 3.2 Activities and timeline per country  
Intervention Activity Description Period 
Kenya Value Chain Analysis Literature review, Field mission with 
interviews 
November 
2015 
 Game Development Literature review, game development 
and testing 
January - 
May2016 
 Value Chain Games Playing of the games June 2016 
 Multi-agent 
Simulation Model 
Developing of the model with input 
from VCA and VCG. Description of 
the model for a science conference  
January – 
July 2016  
Ethiopia Value Chain Analysis Literature review, Field mission with 
interviews 
December 
2015 
Ghana Value Chain Analysis Literature review, Field mission with 
interviews 
December 
2015 
 Game development Literature review, game development 
and testing 
January- 
March 2016 
 Value Chain Games Playing of the games April 2016 
 Multi-agent 
Simulation Model 
Developing of the model with input 
from VCA and VCG 
January – 
October 2016  
Project level Draft report  Draft report shared with IFDC December 
2016 
Dissemination  Validation and 
discussion 
Validation and discussion workshop 
with IFDC (NL) 
March 2017  
Dissemination Validation and 
discussion 
Validation and discussion workshop 
with IFDC (Kenya) and sorghum case
May 2017  
Project level  Final report Final report & closing project June-July 
2017  
 
3.3 Outputs of the project  
The study resulted in the following outputs:  
 VCA studies: 
- VCA on sorghum Kenya (Dijkxhoorn and Plaisier 2015) 
- VCA on soy in Ghana (Plaisier 2016) 
- VCA on potato in Ethiopia (Dijkxhoorn 2016) 
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 VC Games: 
- Report on the outcomes of the games played with 15 farmer groups in 
Kenya (Dijkxhoorn et al. 2016) 
- MSc thesis describing the VC Games played with 16 farmer groups in 
Ghana, the thesis includes a literature overview on trust and risk (Oldenhof 
2016) 
 An agent-based value chain model implemented in NetLogo for Kenya and 
Ghana.  
 Conference paper on a the VC model in Kenya (Verwaart et al. 2016). 
 Article on alternative impact assessment tools, Impact assessment of 
commodity standards: towards inclusive value chains, by Ruerd Ruben 
(2017). 
 Paper on the VC-Lab as an approach to measure impact sustainable and 
inclusive value chain development (forthcoming 2017). 
 Poster and oral presentation at CIRAD Agri-Chains & Sustainable 
Development, Montpellier December 12-14, 2016 (Plaisier and Dijkxhoorn 
2016). 
 PowerPoint presentation with methodology, results and conclusions two 
cases and methodology applied. 
 Final report including methodology, results, conclusions and 
recommendations on two cases and methodology.  
 Dissemination workshop IFDC (the Netherlands). 
 Dissemination and training workshop IFDC & sorghum case Kenya (Kenya) 
(for the report see annex 7). 
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Case 1: Sorghum in Kenya 
4.1 The intervention  
The underlying results focus on one of the 2SCALE cases in Kenya, Meru 
County. This initiative aims to increase the production of sorghum and to 
develop stable and sustainable relationships of farmers with a local sorghum 
processor, Shalem, which delivers to the beer industry. See Text box 4.1 for 
information on Shalem and the Theory of Change (ToC) of the 2SCALE 
intervention itself in Appendix 1.  
 
 
Text box 1: Shalem Investments 
Shalem Investments (Shalem) is a Kenyan trading firm and a buying agent for 
East African Breweries. It buys sorghum from a network of 9,000 smallholder 
farmers, offering premium prices to encourage quality and consistency of 
volumes. The company has bought more than 8,000 tonnes from 2SCALE 
clusters in the past three years. Shalem is a family-owned company with offices 
located near Meru town in the Eastern Province and it operates in the upper 
Eastern region of Kenya, covering all the nine sub-counties of Meru County and 
one sub-county in the neighbouring county of Tharaka-Nthi. The company does 
not have field offices but works with small- scale farmers through Community 
Micro Enterprises for Hope Africa (COMEHA), a non-government organisation 
whose mission is to improve the social economic status of the marginalised 
people in Africa. Shalem and COMEHA have eight members of staff at its offices 
who work for the two organisations. The reputation of Shalem as a reliable buyer 
is very solid. Farmers have the feeling that Shalem will always take the product. 
Farmers perceive Shalem purely as a trader and not as a service provider or 
acting on behalf of them. Shalem in contrary wants to profile as an organisation 
working with and for sorghum producers by creating a win-win situation: profit 
for both the company and the producers. 
 
 
4.2 Value Chain Analysis  
The value chain analysis resulted in the value chain as depicted in Figure 2. In 
Meru County, approximately 10,000 smallholders produce sorghum, among 
other crops. Typically, they grow sorghum on 0.1 to 10 acres in two seasons 
per year, with harvest in March and September. Productivity, as stated by 
farmers participating in the supply chain games, varied widely between 
farmers, ranging from less than 50 kg to over 2,000 kg per acre (average 880 
kg per acre). Productivity is relatively low which is partly due to lack of income 
to purchase (higher volumes and of better quality) inputs, such as high-quality 
seed, fertilisers, pesticides, packaging materials, and threshing services. The 
2SCALE initiative organises collective purchasing of such inputs and provides 
training and advice to the farmers on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). 
Financial services are available to provide loans for input and other services to 
contracted farmer groups, but loans are not mandatory for a contract. A 
detailed overview of the sorghum value chain in Meru is described by 
Dijkxhoorn and Plaisier (2015).  
Production  
The annual production of sorghum in Kenya varies between 173,000 tonnes 
and 254,000 tonnes. The average yield is around 0.57-0.74 tonnes per ha. 
Interviewed stakeholders indicated that there are an estimated 500,000 
sorghum farmers. This means that they produce sorghum on an average area 
of 0.3-0.5 hectares. This roughly equals 1-2 acres. Most farmers produce twice 
per year on small plots of land which are rain fed. However a few farmers 
produce sorghum on larger plots going up to 10-15 acres (4-6 ha). Good 
farmers are estimated to produce 20-25 bags per acre per season. 1 bag 
contains 90 kgs of sorghum (Table A4.1). 
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Season  
A key area of sorghum production is the Eastern Province. Especially around 
Meru there are many sorghum farmers. The region around Meru has many 
different micro climates due to its mountainous character, resulting in large 
differences in temperature and rainfall. This results in large variations between 
the yields of the different farmers, depending on the location. There are two 
sorghum seasons per year. The first one starts in May with harvest in 
September. The second season starts in October with harvest in March (Table 
A4.2).  
 
Sorghum is traditionally produced by farmers for domestic use to make 
porridge and ugali. Nowadays sorghum is increasingly used for the production 
of beer for the poor (called Senator Keg). For this white sorghum is required 
and a specific variety is preferred (Gadam). Traditionally, sorghum is a ‘poor 
man’s meal’, for it is quite cheap to produce and buy. Because of this image, 
it’s a challenge to extend consumption beyond the Bottom of the Pyramid 
(BoP) target group.  
 
Table A4.3 (Appendix 4) gives an overview of the different costs for 1 acre of 
sorghum production. This calculation has uses a modest revenue of 18 bags 
with 90 kg of sorghum and assumes that farmers use certified seed. In case 
the farmers use traditional seed, the price is only KES 150 compared to a price 
of KES 800 per acre. The cost price for 1,680 kg of sorghum production is 
calculated at KES 12 per kg, or KES 19,780 per acre. The yield is expected to 
be 20% lower (an estimated) 3-4 bags with conventional seed though. And 
although lower, there is still profit with conventional seed. During the studied 
season there was a minimum selling price of KES 25 per kg agreed upon with 
Shalem. If volumes of the farmer group increase the farmers group can get a 
better price (up to KES 28 per kg).  
Key actors and their roles 
The figure below presents a brief overview of the main actors in the value 
chain. It provides with an overview of the number of actors present. In 
addition it gives an indication of the selling price of the farmers and the agents 
in terms price in KES per kg. In general farmers bring the sorghum to the 
collectors that store the sorghum on behalf of the agents. However from time 
to time opportunistic brokers come by to buy sorghum from farmers. Often 
they buy the sorghum for a lower price since the farmers are in need of cash. 
They sell it again to the agent and make a small profit.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Sorghum value chain in Meru county, Kenya 
 
Input suppliers 
There are various input suppliers active in the sorghum value chain. They 
supply seeds, fertilisers (subsidised), agro chemicals and soil analyses. Some 
provide information and extension services. The government has a service of 
input provision at a reduced price but it takes very much effort to access these 
subsidised inputs.  
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Finance  
Farmers sometimes need a loan to buy inputs. So the loan will be provided at 
the time when the inputs are needed. The Bank will not provide the inputs, but 
they provide loans so farmer (groups) can buy them on credit. Often the 
finance is arranged via the agent who buys at the input supplier for a large 
group of farmers at the wholesale price. As a result farmers can benefit from a 
discounted input price. Banks (including SACCOs) are however hesitant in 
collaborating with farmers as they know their vulnerable situation, dependency 
on favourable weather and low/no savings. They prefer to work with official 
farmer groups so the group members can be co-guarantee of each other. In 
addition, they do not trust people, they only trust good and strong 
institutions/systems and strong (inter)linkages. The co-guarantee of farmers in 
well-organised farmer groups is one condition; the other is a strong linkage 
and official collaboration with an agent and between agent and producers. 
SACCOs can reduce their risk a little by requiring lenders to buy shares and to 
create co-ownership as such.  
Insurance 
One of the main risks farmers face is the weather. To mitigate this risk, there 
is collaboration with an insurance company. There are links between the 
trader, the bank and farmers but farmers are very sceptical and insurance is a 
somewhat sensitive topic. The costs are high and many farmers are not able or 
willing to pay these. In combination with low trust does not stimulate farmers 
to insure themselves. In addition, agriculture is a risky sector, in general 
leading to a low offer of insurances services.  
Producers  
There are 500,000 sorghum farmers. Farmers are often organised in groups 
ranging from 10 to 100 farmers. This is preferred by the buyers and the bank 
to reduce the costs of transaction and to reduce the risk. Risk can be reduced 
because farmers need to stand surety for each other. Capacities and 
management level of the groups is however low in general and collective 
memory is that of group leaders cheating and betraying their members. 
 
Farmers have to wait until all the farmers from the group have delivered their 
sorghum to the collector. When all group members supplied their produce, 
transport is arranged for via Shalem. It is not possible to supply and receive 
their payments when they want to. As a result farmers tend to side-sell parts 
of their sorghum harvest when in need for cash. Often farmers have to pay 
bills (e.g. school fees) so they sell to other agents or brokers. The price that 
they receive at side-selling is much lower. Often KES 5-8 lower compared to 
the current contract with Shalem (this can be viewed as the regular market 
price).  
 
Price agreement is vocal; there is no official agreement or contract. Only if 
farmers buy input via the bank/ agent using input finance, will they sign a 
contract with the agent to commit themselves to take care of the sorghum with 
their inputs. This is however one way; Shalem does not sign anything. Farmers 
now use mainly the seed varieties Gadam and Sila. These have higher quality, 
are requested by the traders and intend to be drought resistant. Other 
varieties are used for sorghum for own consumption.  
Collectors 
The main agents work with collectors that store and handle the sorghum on 
their behalf at a collection centre. At the premises of the collector the sorghum 
is weighed and prepared for pick up by the agent.  
Agents  
There are 10 official agents that buy sorghum for East African Breweries Ltd 
(EABL). Three key agents are located in Meru. There are three main agents in 
the area under study and all three are supplying to EABL. One of these agents 
is Shalem Investment that works with approximately 10,000 farmers. The third 
company is owned by a former politician that has the reputation to buy at the 
farm gate for lower prices. The agents arrange the transportation from the 
collection centre to the Meru. From there on it is further transported to the 
brewery. The agents pay for the costs of collection, storage and transportation. 
The agents arrange a formal agreement with the buyer (EABL) that indicates 
volume and quality of the sorghum. Besides the main agents there are some 
smaller brokers that are often farmers themselves. They buy and sell from 
other farmers that are in need of cash. They then sell it to Shalem or another 
EABL agent. 
Brewery 
East African Breweries Limited (EABL) needs 30,000 tonnes of sorghum per 
year. Agents have a contract on the amount of sorghum to be sold to EABL. 
Shalem supplies 5,000 tonnes. If an agent delivers less than agreed, EABL will 
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pay the agreed price for the amount delivered, but will decrease the contracted 
amount of sorghum from that agent in the next year. Since the margins are 
low for agents, the profit must come from the traded amount, so a reduction in 
contracted amount is a severe punishment.  
Market outlook  
Currently various stakeholders are looking to diverse the use of sorghum. For 
example to replace maize as an input for the production of animal feed. Or the 
use of sorghum as a low cost substitute for barley for the production of high 
end beers such as Tusker. However these opportunities are currently in the 
process of exploration and a change in mind set (poor men’s meal’) is 
necessary. The sorghum market is vulnerable for external factors, such as VAT 
taxation. In 2014 the government started taxation of sorghum beer in order to 
generate additional tax income. The brewery that produces beer decided to 
reduce their volumes of beer and stopped buying sorghum since an increase of 
price would mean reduced demand. Due to a strong lobby by two Members of 
Parliament from the Meru County, EU-CORD and some breweries the 
government decided to reverse the higher taxation. 
4.3 Games in Kenya  
As explained in the methodology chapter we conduced three games; the trust 
game, the risk game and the VCM game. The games were played in groups of 
16 farmers. To be able to compare between farmers who are part of the 
intervention of 2SCALE and between farmers who are not, we also conducted 
games among farmers not supplying to Shalem. We call these farmers the 
comparison group while the farmers supplying to Shalem are called the 
treatment group. In total we conducted games with 144 farmers in the 
treatment groups and 96 farmers in the comparison group. We played games 
with 9 farmer groups supplying to Shalem and with 6 farmer groups supplying 
to another trader. All games were conducted by the Wageningen Researchers 
in close collaboration of a neutral local assistant to translate. The amounts won 
were paid in the local currency.  
 
We distinguish results of farmers in the treatment and the control groups, see 
Table 4. Groups were similar in age and gender. However, last season, 
treatment groups cultivated more acres with sorghum than control groups. 
Their productivity per acre was higher, resulting in a larger production volume. 
This could be a direct result of the intensive training and coaching on good 
agricultural practices the Shalem farmers received. Treatment groups received 
more input and production loans than control groups. Finally, farmers in the 
control groups earned more in the trust games, and farmers in the treatment 
groups earned more in the VCM games. Total payment was not different 
between the groups. Table 4 provides the results of the descriptive analysis. 
We did not do any additional matching of the treatment and control group due 
to sample size limitations.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive variables of the sorghum farmers in the treatment 
and control groups in Meru county, Kenya 
Variable Treatment
(N=144)
Control 
(N=96)
Significant 
Age (years) 41.8 42.1  
Sex (1=male, 2=female) 1.65 1.70  
Acre 5.2 3.6 ** 
Production (kg) 2,341 1,254 *** 
Productivity (kg/acre) 926 613 *** 
Received input loan (0=no, 1=yes) 0.49 0.19 *** 
Received production loan (0=no, 1=yes) 0.22 0.10 ** 
Payment trust games (KES) 63 68 *** 
Payment risk preference game (KES) 36 37  
Payment VCM games (KES) 44 42 ** 
Total payment (KES) 343 347  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
The position in their farmer group of the farmers is presented in Table 4.2. A 
Pearson chi-squared test showed a higher number of members with a special 
position in the group participating in the games in the control group at 
p=0.054. This is most likely due to the fact that in the treatment groups the 
participants were randomly selected by the researchers, whereas in the control 
groups the group leader could choose the participants freely.  
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Table 4.2 Position in group of the sorghum farmers in the treatment and 
control groups in Meru county, Kenya 
 Treatment Control 
Variable  (N) (%)  (N) (%) 
Member 119 82.6 65 67.7 
Group leader 9 6.3 9 9.4 
Vice group leader 2 1.4 4 4.2 
Secretary 9 6.3 6 6.3 
Vice secretary 1 0.7 0 0 
Book keeper 1 0.7 1 1.0 
Discipline master 0 0 1 1.0 
Missing 1 0.7 1 1.0 
Total 144 100.0 96 100.0 
 
 
For treatment groups, Figure 4.2 provides the number of perceived years 
farmers have delivered sorghum to Shalem. Farmers in the treatment groups 
have been delivering sorghum to Shalem between 0 and 15 years, with most 
farmers (n=52) for 2 years and 30 farmers for 3 years. 13 Farmers indicated 
to never have delivered sorghum to Shalem, mostly because they never 
produced sorghum. 
 
Farmers in the treatment group that delivered sorghum to Shalem, indicated to 
be delivering sorghum to Shalem for on average 2.4 years (min 0 year, max 
15 years, see Figure 4.2). If we exclude the 13 farmers that never supplied to 
Shalem the average is 2.7 years (min 1 year, max 15 years). Despite being 
the control group, 29 farmers have supplied sorghum to Shalem in the past. 
Some of them have supplied Shalem for multiple years. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Number of years farmers in the treatment group indicated to 
have delivered sorghum to Shalem in Meru county, Kenya.  
 
 
Trust between farmers and in different sorghum buyers was measured in the 
trust game (Figure 4.3). Trust in Shalem of the farmers in the treatment group 
was significantly higher (p<0.000) than trust of the control group farmers in 
their normal buyer and trust in new buyers. Trust of farmers in the control 
group in their normal buyer was significantly higher than trust in a new broker. 
No significant difference was observed in trust in a new buyer between the 
treatment and control groups.  
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Figure 4.3 Trust levels of sorghum farmers in different sorghum buyers in 
Meru county, Kenya (Averages with no letters in common are significantly 
different at p<0.000). 
 
 
Trust in Shalem or their normal buyer was asked in the questionnaire during 
debriefing. Farmers in the treatment groups had an average trust in Shalem of 
4.65 (out of 5), which is significantly higher (t=14,698, p<0.000) than the 
average trust of 2.18 farmers in the control group had in their normal buyers. 
 
In the questionnaire during debriefing, the farmers were asked about the 
extent to which their trust in their sorghum buyer increased or decreased. 
Farmers in the treatment groups indicated an average of 4.63 (between ‘it 
increased a little bit’ and ‘it increased much’), which is significantly higher than 
the average of 2.15 (between ‘it did not change’ and ‘it decreased a little bit’) 
of farmers in the control groups (t=14.374, p=0.000). When asked for the 
reason for this in- or decrease, farmers provided multiple reasons (Table 4.1). 
The most important reasons for trust were i) the buyer keeps his promises, ii) 
the buyer offers a good price, iii) the buyer provides training and iv) the buyer 
provides a guaranteed market prior to starting cultivation (Table 4.3). 
 
In the questionnaire during debriefing, the farmers were asked about the 
extent to which their trust in their sorghum buyer increased or decreased. 
Farmers in the treatment groups indicated an average of 4.63 (between ‘it 
increased a little bit’ and ‘it increased much’), which is significantly higher than 
the average of 2.15 (between ‘it did not change’ and ‘it decreased a little bit’) 
of farmers in the control groups (t=14.374, p=0.000). When asked for the 
reason for this in- or decrease, farmers provided multiple reasons (Table 4.3). 
The most important reasons for trust were i) the buyer keeps his promises, ii) 
the buyer offers a good price, iii) the buyer provides training and iv) the buyer 
provides a guaranteed market prior to starting cultivation (Table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3 Qualitative description of sorghum farmers’ trust in their 
sorghum buyer in the treatment and control groups in Meru county, Kenya (in 
%, more answers possible) 
 Treatment Control 
Descriptive aspect of trust yes no yes no 
Keeps promises 24 2 7 22 
Offers good price 29 1 13 34 
Good timing of sorghum collection and 
payment 
6 10 1 6 
Certainty of the market  22 0 2 5 
Provided training on farming 33 0 3 0 
Provided inputs (seeds, loans, other) 14 0 2 0 
Trader is honest 6 0 1 7 
No other buyer available 1 0 5 0 
 
Main findings games Kenya  
The majority of the sorghum farmers are risk averse. Most farmers (61%) are 
very risk averse, and another 24% are risk averse. Only the remaining small 
percentage of 15 shows risk seeking behaviour. There is no difference between 
the treatment group and the control group.  
 
Farmers supplying Shalem have higher trust. Trust was measured in the trust 
game and in the questionnaire during debriefing:  
 Trust in Shalem measured in the trust game: Trust of the farmers in the 
treatment group was significantly higher (p<0.000) than trust of the control 
group farmers in their normal buyer and trust in new buyers. Trust of 
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farmers in the control group in their normal buyer was significantly higher 
than trust in a new broker. No significant difference was observed in trust in 
a new buyer between the treatment and control groups.  
 Questionnaire during debriefing: Farmers in the treatment groups had an 
average trust in Shalem of 4.65 (out of 5), which is significantly higher 
(t=14,698, p<0.000) than the average trust of 2.18 farmers in the control 
group had in their normal buyers. 
The most important reasons for increasing trust were i) the buyer keeps his 
promises, ii) the buyer offers a good price, iii) the buyer provides training and 
iv) the buyer provides a guaranteed market prior to starting cultivation. 
Farmers supply on average for 2.7 years to Shalem. 
 
The development of trust depends on the experience of the farmer with their 
buyers. Trust levels towards new buyers are low compared to average trust in 
Shalem. In the three consecutive trust games with a new (unknown) buyer, 
farmers that were confronted with a negative experience, i.e. they received in 
return only half of the amount of coins they sent, showed a consistent 
decrease in trust in the three games, i.e. a negative trust update. In contrast, 
the farmers that were confronted with a positive experience, i.e. they received 
in return twice the amount of coins they sent, showed a consistent increase in 
trust in the three games, i.e. a positive trust update. The farmers with a 
neutral or slightly positive experience did not show a consistent development 
in trust.  
 
Trust uptake among all farmers is depending on the behaviour of other 
farmers. As soon as farmers have a negative experience due to actions of 
other farmers, trust is decreasing. Trust between farmers was measured with 2 
items: 1) group trust with the VCM games, and 2) farmer trust with the trust 
games between farmers. No significant differences were observed between 
treatment and control groups in the trust towards other farmers.  
 
Although the transaction costs s are not measured directly, a higher trust level 
by Shalem farmers is likely to result in lower transaction costs s. Transaction 
costs s are guided by price and non-price commitments. While the price 
commitments result in net (expected) value added that each of the agents can 
capture from the transaction, the non-price elements are of vital importance 
for the exchange of information between the agents and the behaviour of the 
agents. Since Shalem is providing a continuous positive trust uptake among 
the farmers it is likely that the trust will further increase.  
4.4 Multi-agent Simulation Model of sorghum  
Approach 
A simulation of the sorghum value chain as described in the previous section 
has been designed in NetLogo. This section describes a summary of the 
simulation following the updated Overview, Design concepts, and Details 
(ODD) protocol developed by Grimm et al. (2010).  
 
The active entities in the simulation represent plots of land, farmers that 
cultivate the land to produce a crop, and processors that contract farmers to 
deliver their produce. The present simulation sets up a single processor. The 
simulation sets up local collectors and aggregators, but they currently play no 
active role. The brewery is not represented as an agent. Some farmers are 
given a role as group head. This is indicated in a state variable. All farmers 
have a state variable pointing to their group head and a state variable 
comprising the set of group members. Farmers maintain a list of processors 
they know and maintain associated trust they have in the processors. 
Processors maintain a list of the farmers and associated trust, contracts and 
deliveries with each of these farmers. Farmers maintain trust in each of the 
other members of their group. All trust is represented as an experience-based 
subjective probability that the others will comply with the contracts.  
 
Natural conditions affecting the harvest, such as rainfall, temperature, and 
pests are represented by a single variable for which a different random value is 
generated for each cropping season. The value of natural conditions is equal 
for all farmers and thus affects the harvest of the entire cluster. The range of 
harvest fluctuations due to natural conditions is a parameter that can be set in 
the user interface. Similarly, market price is a system level variable that is 
randomly generated for each cropping season. The farmers’ temptation to 
side-sell is modelled to depend on the current market price. 
 
A simulation run typically includes 10,000 farmers (in groups of 16) and a 
single processor, and typically spans a period of ten years, with a time step of 
 34 | Wageningen Economic Research Report 2017-031 
half a year (one sorghum cropping season). Simulations are run for a period of 
20 growing seasons (10 years). 
 
In the basic simulation run the same decision options will be used as in the 
game session. Decision rules will be deducted from the actual behaviour of 
real-life subjects in the VC game session, taking into account various context 
variables such as pricing and transaction costs. Further, agents’ traits, such as 
risk attitude, and changes that occurred during the game session including 
reputation formation / trust building, changes in risk attitude, and changing 
price expectations are included in the simulation model. Finally, a goal function 
(maximum expected value, maximum, minimum regret, two-step e.g. once a 
certain income level has been attained) has been assigned to each virtual 
agent. Each simulation run typically includes 10,000 farmers and a single 
processor, and spans a period of ten years. Figure 4.4 represents a time step 
in the simulation cycle. The user may set parameters and intervene in the 
simulation by pressing the ‘DEFECT’ button to make the processor defect in 
paying the contracted farmers. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4  Process overview of a time step representing a cropping season 
 
Descriptive results ABM Kenya  
The agent-based simulation is parameterised with data collected in a value 
chain mapping mission and a baseline survey for the quantitative evaluation of 
2SCALE. Emergent properties to be observed are farm income and the 
availability of sorghum to the processor. Key results are the following: 
 The contract price currently proposed by the processor is sufficient to 
contract both risk -avoiding and risk-neutral farmers, given the historic range 
of farm-gate prices. 
 If farmers enter into contracts, if they use adequate inputs, and if they are 
trained to apply modern farming methods, the harvested volumes are 
sufficient for the processor to deliver to the brewery and the farmers make 
increased profits. 
 In the first season some side-selling occurs by contracted farmers who are in 
urgent financial need before the harvest is delivered and payments are made 
by the processor. 
 The scale of this initial side-selling is small and does not seriously affect 
trust. 
 Due to opportunistic side-selling by some farmers, both processors’ trust and 
mutual trust in farmer groups vanish after some seasons if market prices 
exceed the contract price. 
 Group members can get in need of cash, and side-sell part of their next 
harvest, which further undermines trust in the system. 
 If the contracts and loans system does not collapse due to opportunistic side-
selling in the first seasons of the simulation, the farmers’ financial positions 
develop to a sustainable level where they can source adequate inputs from 
their revenues, even without loans. 
 In the latter situation production remains at the increased level, and the 
processor can source inputs from the market without contracts, generally at 
a lower price than the contract price; however, then the farmers’ incomes 
are lower than with the contracts. 
 Occasional defection by the processor strongly affects farm income but, since 
they have no alternative, farmers re-enter into contracts unless the deceit is 
frequently repeated. 
 
The average results of the simulation are particularly sensitive to the farmers’ 
honesty (their compliance when tempted by high market prices), the negative 
trust update factor (will deceivers be given a second chance?), and the 
combination of contract price and farmers’ risk avoidance. An extensive 
sensitivity analysis is included in Verwaart et al. (2016).  
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Settings ABM Kenya  
Table 4.4 displays the default parameter settings. The ‘savings’ switch is by 
default set to false: farmers are assumed to spend their all revenue from a 
harvest during the following growing season on inputs for the next harvest and 
on cost of living.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Default parameters  
Parameter Value Unit Parameter Value Unit 
Farms 9,216  Minimal-natural-conditions 0.5  
Minimal-farmgate-price 14,00
0 
KES/tonn
e 
Savings FALSE  
Maximal-farmgate-price 30,00
0 
KES/tonn
e 
Minimal-risk-aversion 5.00E-
05
1/KES 
Local-market-price 14,00
0 
KES/tonn
e 
Maximal-risk-aversion 2.00E-
04
1/KES 
Aggregator-availability 20 % Minimal-initial-trust 0.2  
Optimal-inputs-cost 14,00
0 
KES/ha Maximal-initial-trust 1  
Labour-cost 22,00
0 
KES/ha Minimal-honesty 0.2  
Loan-per-ha 30,00
0 
KES/ha Maximal-honesty 1  
Cost-loan & insurance 5,000 KES/ha Configure-from-game-
data 
FALSE  
Post-harvest-cost-per-
tonne 
2,900 KES/tonn
e 
To-be-delivered 5,000 tonne 
Transaction-cost-market 1,000 KES Farmers-contract-price 25,000 KES/tonn
e 
Transaction-cost-contract 0 KES Maximal-group-bonus 2,000 KES/tonn
e 
Basic-expected-yield 1.2 tonne/ha Bonus-lower-bound 80 % 
Improved-inputs-yield 5  Positive-trust-update-
factor 
0.05  
Minimal-skills-factor 0  Negative-trust-update-
factor 
0.10  
Main findings ABM Kenya  
Farmers’ characteristics can be initialized in two ways. By default, risk 
aversion, initial trust, trust update, and honesty are drawn from the specified 
ranges and the specified trust update factors are applied. When the ‘configure- 
Farmers’ characteristics can be initialised in two ways. By default, risk 
aversion, initial trust, trust update, and honesty are drawn from the specified 
ranges and the specified trust update factors are applied. When the ‘configure-
from-game-data’ switch is true, the parameter values are drawn at random 
from the game outcomes. Emergent properties to be observed are farm 
income and the availability of sorghum to the processor. 
 
Data are comparable for both configurations, except for the stronger decay of 
the number of loans in the runs with default parameters; the agents with zero 
trust-update in the game-configured runs maintain their group trust even if 
group members defect. Dynamics of some outcomes are shown in Figure 4.5. 
Initially farmers enter into contracts and groups apply for loans. Then the 
number of loans decreases and after that the number of contracts. As can be 
seen from the right graphs, in particular the less productive farmers lose their 
contracts.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Dynamics of some emergent outcomes from a simulation 
configured with default settings (upper row) and a run with game-based 
settings (bottom row) (source: Verwaart et al., 2016) 
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Figure 4.6 presents the causes of the decline of loans and contracts. Figure 4 
provides insight into the causes. The middle graph shows side-selling. Farmers 
side-sell when in urgent need for cash. Group members, who stand surety, 
must redeem their loans, lose trust in the group, and no longer apply for loans. 
The middle graph shows opportunistic side-sales by contracted farmers under 
high market prices (left graph), continuing after the loans system has 
collapsed. The defecting farmers lose the processors’ trust (right graph) and 
contracts. The results show a decline in harvest volumes and deliveries on 
contracts over the simulated period, but not to an extent that the processor 
cannot fulfil its current contract. However, many farmers remain poor and 
there is no room to satisfy new demands. Sensitivity analysis of the simulation 
may identify promising interventions. The most promising could be to improve 
the weaker producers’ skills. The sensitivity analysis also shows that a KES 
1,000 lower contact price of KES 2,400 strongly affects deliveries to the 
producer (-11%), side-sales (from 10 to 13%), and farmers’ gross margins (-
10%). Lower honesty has an effect of +13% on gross margins, but affects 
deliveries with -16%. As may be expected, variations in the trust parameters 
affect outcomes up to 10%. In the present setting, sensitivity to risk attitude is 
weak, but it is stronger with lower contract prices.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Causes of the decline of loans and contracts (game-based 
settings) (source: Verwaart et al., 2016) 
 
 
Results of the simulation runs show that in order to establish a stable supply of 
sorghum on contracts:  
 It is essential that the processor provides a stable and (relatively) high 
contract price against uncertain alternatives for farmers.  
 Another key to long-run success is the extent to which individual farmers are 
convinced to comply, even when market prices exceed the contract price.  
 Finally, improving farmers skills is an effective way to increase total sorghum 
production and volume supplied to the processor.  
 
A limitation of the present simulation is that local harvest and local farmgate 
price are assumed to vary independently. The relation is known to be complex 
and dependent on the harvest of other products, such as maize. Sorghum is a 
rather draught-tolerant product. In dry seasons a bad harvest of maize may 
cause a great demand for sorghum as a substitute. Such dependencies are not 
included in the simulation. Appendix 3 describes simulation outcomes for 
several assumed harvest-price relations. The results indicate that for the 
processor greater shortages due to side-selling may occur if a strong inverse 
relation is assumed between total local harvest and local farmgate price. Actual 
data on the harvest-price relation are lacking. It is recommended that this data 
is collected. If the relation would be found to be strong, that would stress the 
relevance of finding ways to convince the farmers to comply with the contracts. 
4.5 Conclusion sorghum case Kenya  
The 2SCALE partner, Shalem collects sorghum as input for low costs beer 
production. Shalem has a contract with the brewery stating the volume and 
minimal quality to be delivered. Shalem contracts farmer groups to produce 
this volume of sorghum of sufficient quality. A fixed contract price is offered 
prior to each farmer with a relatively attractive price compared to average 
prices on other markets. In 2015, this price was KES 25 per kg. This lifts the 
risk of price fluctuations off the farmers. Groups can receive a price premium if 
they collectively deliver more than what is minimally expected given the 
natural conditions and the amount of inputs applied (up to KES 2 per kg in 
2015). Farmers have several reasons not to deliver (part of) their harvests 
according to contract. Need for immediate cash may urge them to side-sell 
part of their harvest to other buyers and side-selling may occur if buyers 
passing by offering good prices to be immediately paid in cash. Offered prices 
range from KES 20 to KES 27 per kg. By contracting farmer groups, Shalem 
aims to hedge the risk of individual farmers side-selling to other aggregators. 
To control transaction costs s Shalem works with farmers organised in groups. 
In addition, Shalem has implemented a network of collection points with 
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storage facilities in the remote villages, where contracted farmers can bring 
their produce. These collection points are often at the premises of individual 
farmers being member of the group and collect solely for Shalem. Shalem 
collects the sorghum from these local collection points, and transfers it to the 
beer brewery after random quality checks and without further processing. 
 
Trust and risk attitude are assumed central issues in this value chain 
development initiative. Shalem should trust the farmers to deliver a sufficient 
volume complying to the minimum quality standards to fulfil its contractual 
obligations to the brewery. However, side-selling occurs for two reasons: (1) 
farmers’ urgent need for cash and (2), if market price is high, opportunistic 
behaviour depending on the farmer’s honesty. In case of large-scale side-
selling, Shalem must buy sorghum form other sources or is not able to comply 
with the contractual arrangements with the brewer. Contracts on minimum 
price and guaranteed purchase may hedge the farmers’ market price risk, but 
farmers must trust Shalem to pay promptly after delivery and to pay the 
agreed price. Farmers must trust their fellow group members to deliver their 
full harvest of good quality in order to cash the volume premium. Based on 
behavioural economics insights, games were designed to gather data on trust, 
honesty (free riding) and risk. 
 
The agent-based simulation is initialised with data collected in a value chain 
mapping mission, a baseline survey for the quantitative evaluation of 2SCALE, 
and games played with farmer groups in Kenya. The results of the simulation 
runs showed that if the sorghum processor can afford to provide a stable and 
high contract price against uncertain alternatives for farmers, a stable contract 
supply to the processor can be expected with farmers’ income being higher 
than without contracts. Occasional high market prices resulted in farmers’ side-
selling and lower volumes supplied to the processor. The extent to which 
individual farmers can be trusted or convinced to comply, even when market 
prices are high, is the key to long-run success of the system. Finally, improving 
farmers skills is an effective way to increase total sorghum production and 
volume supplied to the processor.  
 
A validation and discussion workshop was organised with Wageningen 
researchers, IFDC, Shalem and sorghum farmers in May 2017. The programme 
and report can be found in appendices 6 and 7.  
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Case 2: Soy in Ghana
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Case 2: Soy in Ghana 
5.1 The intervention  
A large problem for smallholder farmers in Ghana is to get access to the 
market. The 2SCALE programme intends to support the incorporation of 
smallholder farmers in a soy cluster or agriculture apex organisation. This is 
implemented by grouping together in cooperatives (see text box 2 and annex 1 
for more information on the intervention itself). A large problem in the 
functioning of the value chains can be distrust between the partners. The 
2SCALE programme aims to include the smallholder farmers in a strong value 
chain, and reduce distrust.  
 
 
Text box 5.1: Soy clusters 
In Northern Ghana, IFDC supports 4 different clusters (+- 2,000 farmers per 
cluster) of soybean producers by providing BSS. These services are provided by 
2 BSS -providers, in northern Ghana these are 2 NGOs: SEND and EPDRA, both 
organisations currently serve 2 clusters. The partnership in Ghana started in 
2012 with 2 clusters, and in 2013, 2 extra clusters were added. The office of 
IFDC is located in the northern city of Tamale. Another cluster, in the area of 
Savelugu is not operational anymore due to a lack of trust between the farmers 
and the BSS. 
 
 
In this research, we use the soy clusters in Kpandai and Saboba as treatment 
areas, and the Zabzugu Tatale cluster as comparison group (see Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Soy clusters in Ghana 
Clusters BSS Intervention start Status  
Kpandai SEND 2012 Active  
Saboba EPDRA 2012 Active 
Zabzugu SEND - Under negotiation  
Savelugu -  Closed 
Chereponi EPDRA 2013 Active 
Salaga SEND 2013 Active 
 
5.2 Value chain analysis Soy Ghana  
Northern Ghana is relatively poor, isolated, dry, and politically unstable when 
compared to the rapidly developing and urbanising south. However, in recent 
years the northern regions above the 8th parallel (the ‘SADA North’) have 
received much government and donor attention in the form of agricultural 
subsidies and social programmes. This so-called Breadbasket Initiative aims to 
transform the north into a more stable and prosperous area, with a focus on 
smallholder production of staple grains and legumes, particularly maize, rice, 
and soybean (EAT-USAID 2012).  
 
The market presents an interesting but limited demand for soy. Currently, 
modest expansion of local production processed in existing facilities can 
substitute the imported soybean meal demanded by the poultry industry. 
Soybean is a relatively new crop in Ghana (Akramov and Malek 2012), but is 
playing an increasingly important role in the rural economy of farm households 
in northern Ghana, and especially the eastern corridor of the Northern Region 
of the country, cannot be neglected. Northern region alone contributes 70% of 
national soybean area and 77% of national production (SRID 2012). Several 
soybean demonstrations are established annually in the region by both 
 40 | Wageningen Economic Research Report 2017-031 
governmental and non-governmental organisations with the aim of increasing 
productivity and production. Etwire et al. (2013) reported that the crop is 
gaining popularity and acceptance among farmers in Ghana including those of 
Saboba and Chereponi districts. According to Ugwu and Ugwu (2010), the 
benefits of soybean over other grain legume (such as groundnut and cowpea) 
include lower susceptibility to pests and diseases, better storage quality and 
larger leaf biomass which translates into soil fertility benefit to subsequent 
crops. 
 
However, widespread smallholder production of soy would be a dangerous 
venture. When small, targeted support is merited, investors and donors must 
fully understand the incentives at stake for the smallholders. These producers 
are inherently risk-averse and unlikely to produce more consistently if the 
market demonstrates uncertainty. The risk entailed with accepting expensive 
inputs on credit should not be underestimated, since trends in the market for 
Ghanaian maize and soy have been intermittently volatile or flat. Export 
markets may exist, but trade policy is uncertain and the linkages are not 
currently in place. 
 
Soybeans are not only a valuable source of feed for livestock and fish but a 
good source of protein for human diet (Masuda and Goldsmith 2009). El 
Agroudy et al. (2011) reported that soybeans contain 30% cholesterol free oil, 
40% protein and contain most essential vitamins required by human beings. 
Ghana’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MoFA) as well as its development partners have been 
promoting soybean production because of its potential to increase income and 
enhance nutritional status of households (Mbanya 2011). In northern Ghana, 
most agricultural interventions promote the production and use of the soybean 
crop mainly through value chain improvements.  
Soybean production 
Currently Ghana produces between 50,000 to 60,000 tonnes of soymeal and 
soy protein a year. And a little less than that amount is imported. However, 
the amount isn’t meeting needs that could reach up to 200,000 tonnes (2015, 
American Soybean Association1). Soybean is mostly grown as a cash crop, 
although there seems to be little or no evidence about its profitability for 
                                                 
1  http://www.feednavigator.com/Markets/Better-feed-development-improved-poultry-sector-
may-lead-to-agro-economic-boost-in-Ghana 
smallholders. Other crops grown for cash include cotton and cowpea. Maize, 
rice and cassava are mostly grown for consumption. Yam and vegetables are 
grown for both consumption and sale. Production of soy is once a year.  
 
The smallholder producers cultivate on average 1 to 2 acres. The loan they 
access from the bank is maximum for 2 acres. To access high quality soybean 
seed is a challenge in Ghana. It is not common to buy new seed; producers are 
used to use their own soybean seed. Newly introduced seed (genotypes) 
varieties by SARI Ghana are Afayak and Suong-Poung2. Some producers in the 
IFDC programme were introduced to the Afayak seed used at demonstration 
plots. With the Afayak seed production is estimated to be 8 maxi bags per acre 
(= 400 kg per acre). With own seed / seed from the local market from 
colleague soybean producers, production is approximately 3 to 6 bags per acre 
so 150 to 300 kg per acre.  
Estimation of production costs  
Production loans at banks vary from GHS 300-400 per acre. Maximum to get a 
loan for is 2 acre. An expert estimation on the costs of production for soy is 
given by one of the actors in the IFDC programme (per acre, November 2015):  
 Tractor fee : GHS 70 
 Seed : GHS 59  
 Inoculant : GHS 20  
 Bags and transport : GHS 50 (transport from farm to house/store) 
 Transport : 0 (via apex) 
 Dues to apex : GHS 24 (GHS 2 per person per month (on average) 
Production 
According to reports from among others USAID (2012), yield reports range 
from just 500 kilograms per hectare (208 kilograms /acre) to 2,000 kilograms 
per hectare (833 kilograms / acre), with a generally agreed-upon average of 
1,200 kilograms per hectare or 500 kilograms per acre. The farmers 
themselves commonly refer to the number of bags per acre. They mentioned 3 
to 6 maxi bags per acre, depending on how planting was done (whether in row 
or not) with own seed/from the local market and without the use of inoculum. 
The sizes of (maxi) bags vary per region but they meant here a bag of 55 
                                                 
2  http://savannahnewsblogspotcom.blogspot.nl/2013/02/sari-introduces-new-maize-soybean-
seeds.html.  
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kilograms which means a yield of 165 to 330 kilograms per acre. With the use 
of inoculum, yields increase with 20-30%. 
Prices  
Marketing experts have indicated the farm gate price of soy in November 2015:  
 Salaga: 114.5 tonnes marketed at GHS 153 per 100 kilograms maxi bag.  
 Saboba: 362.8 tonnes marketed at GHS 77per 100 kilograms maxi bag.  
 
Salaga: there was a buyer at pre-harvest time who expressed interest to buy 
soybeans from the farmers at a price of GHS 1.80 per kilograms, but he did 
not return. The farmers cannot and will not approach a buyer themselves. 
That’s the responsibility of the apex and they leave the responsibility there. 
Now the farmers received GHS 1.53 per kilograms, and this is a good price but 
when farmers were promised GHS 1.80 per kilograms, they were counting on 
that amount and the price appears to be very low at GHS 1.53 per kg.  
 
Price during the visit (November 2015): approximately 4 mini bags = GHS 500 
to GHS 600. One mini bag in this situation is 100 kilograms so 400 kilograms 
yields approximately GHS 500 to GHS 600. This is approximately GHS 1.38 per 
kilogram. Sometimes prices can be very bad demotivating farmers to continue 
soybean production. Other prices mentioned are GHS 0.70 per kg or GHS 1 for 
2 kilograms. The market price is approximately GHS 1 per kilograms. But 
scaling is not precise so you never know whether you have exactly 1 kilogram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The soy value chain  
 
Key actors and their roles 
Figure 5.1 present a brief overview of the main actors in the value chain. The 
relations vary per cluster, but in general, (the organised) producers bring the 
soybeans to a warehouse of an individual in the community. When all group 
members supplied their produce, the processor or aggregator which agreed 
upon a transaction with the producers, collects the produce. There are no 
written or signed contracts at pre-harvest time, only at the time of transaction 
a contract is signed. They transact and decide on oral agreements. There are 
some pre-harvest negotiations to express intentions, but no agreements on 
price and volumes are made. The farmers side-sell if they need immediate 
cash.  
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Facilitation 
Soybean production in Ghana takes place in the northern region and IFDC has 
a stationary in the northern city Tamale. Field activities of IFDC started in 2012 
with 2 clusters built around farmers organisations. The number of targeted 
smallholders of soybeans is 18,500 with 7,500 women smallholders. The lead 
partners in the clusters are farmers or producer organisations. The following 
lead partners take part in the value chain strengthening activities:  
 Dodoorifom Akonvi Farmers Association (Chereponoi); 
 Bileegnan Soybean Producers Cooperative and apex (Saboba); 
 Salaga Farmers’ Cooperative & Union (Salaga); 
 Banda Borae Soybeen Farmers Association (Banda Borae); 
 
IFDC subcontracted the NGOs Social enterprise development Foundation 
(SEND) Ghana and  
Evangelical Presbyterian Development and Relief Agency (EPDRA) as Business 
Development Service Providers in the Soy agribusiness clusters. Both 
organisations have their own approach, methodology and working area. SEND 
Ghana is responsible for the Banda Borae and Salaga clusters. EPRDA is 
working in the Chereponi and Saboba soy agribusiness clusters. Main activities 
of both organisations are:  
 Group and leadership development of farmer groups (e.g. mobilisation, 
organisation, financial education, management, collective action).  
 Agronomics: training on GAPs, provision of other varieties of seed, 
establishment of demonstration plots, post-harvest management trainings, 
quality improvement training, introduction of inoculants.  
 Value chain strengthening: identification and linkage of buyers and 
producers, facilitate collective aggregation; training on value chain concepts, 
facilitation in access to loans.  
Input suppliers 
There are various input suppliers active in the soybean value chain. They 
supply seeds, fertilisers (subsidised), agro chemicals, and soil analyses. Some 
provide information and extension services. There are however no contracts 
between producer organisations and input providers and deals are made 
individually and not as a producer group. Seed provision and delivery of 
inoculant seems a challenge as availability at country level is very low.  
 
Finance  
A challenge soybean farmers face is to get credit for their inputs. The major 
costs are related to the rental fee for the service of tractors. There are 
contractual arrangements with two banks at this moment: the Bonzali rural 
Bank in Yendi and the Credit Union in Kpandai. Lately, more banks are 
established and farmers do not want to ‘put all their eggs in one basket’. The 
farmer groups are facilitated by the service providers to establish new contacts 
with banks. Banks hesitate to provide credit due to the risk sensitiveness of 
agriculture. All banks have similar procedures. There is a fixed amount of 
production loan you can apply for, this amount varies per year. It is only 
possible to apply as a group and the apex organisation summits a formal 
application on behalf of the groups. The group of farmers are together 
responsible for repaying the loan. Negotiations take place every year between 
the apex body of the farmers’ cooperative, the government body of the credit 
union and a representative of SEND Ghana. It is not very difficult because 
there are not so many fluctuations.  
Weather insurance 
One of the main risks farmers face is the weather. Farmers do not have formal 
relationships or contracts with (weather) insurance companies. A weather 
insurance is not common for farmers and no activities in this field are foreseen.  
Producers  
Soybean is produced in the northern regions of Ghana. The majority is 
organised in producer groups or stimulated (by NGOs among others) to 
organise. The number of members varies from 40 to 100 farmers. Producer 
groups are again organised in apex organisations. Buyers and banks prefer to 
transact with organised farmers to reach volumes and to reduce transaction 
costs s and risk. Risk can be reduced because farmers need to stand surety for 
each other. Illiteracy amongst farmers is high leading to a dependency on farm 
leaders. Thus, negotiations are done by the apex and cooperative leaders on 
behalf of the members. Group assets are very low as contribution fees are 
minimal (e.g. one bowl of soybeans per member). Some groups can make use 
of an office of an NGO/Business service provider and can afford to pay an office 
manager, sometimes with a device. Some groups have some savings on a 
collective bank account.  
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Farmers have to wait until all the farmers from the group bring their soybeans 
to the collector, a private warehouse or a warehouse provided by the apex or a 
NGO. It is not possible to supply and receive payments when they want to. As 
a result farmers tend to sell parts of their harvest at the local market or to 
brokers who passes by when in need for cash. Prices vary each year and are 
very fluctuating. No contracts are established at pre-harvest season. Only 
expressions of interest are there, but without pre-defined volumes or prices. 
Sometimes a margin is mentioned but to agree upon prices is very risky for 
processors. Farmers perceive it is as a risk to agree beforehand on volumes. 
They face several risks and do not want to commit to one buyer because no 
minimum price can be guaranteed to them. Farmers have the option to choose 
between several aggregators and processors. The majority is based in Kumasi. 
Farmers/farmer groups do not always sell all their produce when the price is 
very low. Soybeans can be stored for years and sold when prices are 
favourable but the majority of farmers face urgent financial needs or received 
credit so they have to sell immediately after harvest. 
Aggregators/collectors  
The Savanna Farmers Marketing Company (SFMC) is established by farmer 
groups and indicates to act on behalf of the farmers. The company is based in 
Tamale and geographically close to the producers. Previously SFMC was the 
one and major aggregator buying from the producers and selling to processors 
in Kumasi and Accra. SFMC tried to be a strong partner by offering a fair price 
and other services (such as transport, credit, warehousing). Due to 
mismanagement and internal problems farmers lost trust in SFMC and the 
company almost collapsed. At that time, farmers bypassed SFMC and started 
direct negotiations with processors. The processors interact with the group 
leaders and have some individual aggregators/brokers in the field. In one 
cluster the apex organisation acts as an aggregator because they were given 
storage facility. Soybeans can be stored for several years but because there is 
a huge need for cash, the maximum period of storage is usually a few months.  
Processors  
Processed soybeans are used as an ingredient to feed for livestock and fish but 
to a lower extent it is used for domestic consumption. Some local women 
groups and some small-scale processors make soybean products such as 
dawadawa or gari (used in preparing local dishes) and soy-kebabs. The 
farmers in the clusters produce to sell for animal feed because the products for 
human consumption are not very profitable yet.  
 
Ghana has about 15 commercial feed mills with a total installed operating 
capacity of circa 1,000 tonnes per day. However, because most buyers are 
small-scale operators, most feed millers produce only 40-50% of their 
capacity. Most small and medium-scale operations prefer concentrates as it is 
cheap, convenient and easier to transport. Yet, the majority of commercial 
mills produce mash feed and only a few produce high feed concentrates or 
pelletise feed. A major feed processing plant in the country is Ghana Nuts 
Limited which has an annual capacity of 60,000 tonnes. It produces its Poultry 
Master brand, which comprises solvent-extracted soy bean and cotton meal 
with excellent nutritional quality. Another important feed mill is Kosher Feed 
Mill which is located in Accra and accessible to many poultry farmers. Other 
commercial mills in Ghana are Greater Accra Poultry Association, Agricare, 
Central Feed Mill and Higirifred Mills (2014 RVO). 
 
Commercial poultry farms in Ghana are mostly found in the Greater Accra, 
Ashanti and Brong Afaho regions. These farms can be categorised in three 
groups: large-scale (over 10,000 birds), medium-scale (5,000-10,000 birds) 
and small-scale (50-5,000 birds). At the moment, there are less than twenty 
large-scale poultry enterprises in Ghana, producing mainly eggs with limited 
production of broilers, mostly for festive seasons (Christmas, Easter) when 
Ghanaians normally buy live chickens. These farms are privately owned and 
some operate their own feed mills, hatcheries and parent stock. The level of 
bio-security in these enterprises is high and most of these farms follow the 
vaccination programme recommended by the Veterinary Services Directorate 
of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The vast majority of poultry producers 
(95%), however, fall into the small- to medium-scale group. Small-scale 
businesses mainly produce broiler birds, whereas the medium-scale category 
mainly produces eggs. Both groups practice limited biosecurity, making these 
operations vulnerable to disease outbreaks such as Avian Influenza. Yet, the 
Government of Ghana has been vigilant in the prevention of H5N1 Avian 
Influenza outbreaks and a surveillance system has been put in place to monitor 
the threat at borders, market places and resting places of wild birds.  
 
Due to the dominance of layer bird production, Ghana’s poultry feed industry is 
mostly focused on layer feed. The main ingredients used for feeding are maize, 
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fishmeal, premix, concentrates and soybean. Except locally produced white 
maize, most feed inputs are imported. Prices of most inputs, except vaccines, 
have increased over the last years. Controlling animal feed costs is critical as it 
amounts to 82% of the variable production costs. Therefore, some feed 
manufacturers are switching to low-cost substitutes such as cotton-seed cake, 
palm kernel cake, soybean cake, copra cake, fish meal and other by-products 
of agro-processing. Maize typically forms 50-60% of the total feed formulation. 
In fact, the poultry industry consumes almost 30% of all white maize in Ghana. 
Since maize is such an important component of poultry feed, its price is a key 
determinant of prices of poultry products.  
 
Ghana is almost self-sufficient in its production of maize and import numbers 
are decreasing: between 2011 and 2013 imports dropped with 70%. However, 
now that the Government of Ghana wants to expand the poultry sector, more 
efficient ways of producing maize and soy beans are needed to increase yields. 
Between December and January, the availability of local maize and soy beans 
is abundant and affluent farmers buy it at this time to store it for feeding 
throughout the year. Those without surplus money buy it monthly at higher 
prices, thus reducing their profits. A problem with local maize reported by 
poultry farmers is that it can be mouldy and of bad quality, causing farmers to 
add toxin binders to prevent illnesses. 
Consumption  
The estimated per capita consumption of poultry products in Ghana has 
increased by 33% from 4 kg meat in 2010 to 6.6 kg in 2012. Beef and poultry 
meat contributes to 40% of the total animal protein consumption with the rest 
coming from fish. Ghanaian consumers in urban areas have a high preference 
for imported frozen poultry products as they are cheaper and are processed as 
whole chicken or pre-cut. In Ghana local processing of poultry into cut portions 
to facilitate quick and easy use by consumers is limited. Nevertheless, 
Ghanaians generally prefer the taste of local chicken over imported chicken as 
it has more flavour and a better structure. Darko Farms and Cottage Farms 
have seen this market opportunity and have opened cold stores in Accra selling 
frozen local poultry products ranging from whole birds to pre-cut chicken legs.  
Market outlook  
The most immediate opportunity for Ghana’s soybean industry is the direct 
substitution of imported soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean oil with locally 
produced and processed products. The industry imports between 35,000 and 
63,000 tonnes of soybean equivalent as processed meal (between 48% and 
61% of the total soybean meal market). The challenge is purely about the 
availability of raw materials, since the crush capacity to meet these volumes of 
processed meal exists. While current use is 30%, substituting for current 
imports would increase crush use to approximately 70%. Another challenge 
making it hard to compete is recent government policy: in 2013, the 
Government of Ghana removed customs duties on poultry inputs such as feed, 
additives, drugs and vaccines. 
 
Over the longer term and slightly more complex investment opportunity will be 
meeting Ghana’s increasing demand for chicken meat with locally produced 
broilers fed with locally produced and processed grains, including soybeans. 
Finally, longer-term soy industry growth might come from the export of 
finished soybean products into West African urban markets.  
5.3 Games Ghana  
Like in Kenya, three games were played among soy farmers in Ghana, the 
trust game, the risk game and the so called VMC game. A comparison group 
was constructed to be able to compare results between farmers who are part 
of the 2SCALE intervention (the treatment group) and farmers who are not 
(the comparison group). The games were conducted in groups of 16 farmers 
with in total 160 farmers in the treatment groups (i.e. 10 groups) and 96 
farmers in the comparison group (i.e. 6 groups). The games were conducted 
by one Wageningen Researcher and a master student of Development 
Economics of Wageningen University. They were assisted by local enumerators 
who translated into the local language of the participants. All participants were 
paid the amount they won in the local currency. The games were combined 
with a small survey to collect some relevant data at individual level. The games 
were customised to the local situation of the soy context in Ghana. That means 
that the games are different than the games conducted in Kenya. In the 
current setting of Ghana, group trust and trust in the group leader is very 
important so games were constructed to focus on these trust levels. There are 
more than one processors and traders in this case and no multi-annual 
contracts between farmers (groups) and buyers are in place.  
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Table 5.2 shows the main characteristics of the participants. Farmers in the 
control group were on average 39 years old, 41% of them were women. 44% 
of the treatment group received a production loan, and 56% of the control 
group received a loan. We did not do any additional matching of the treatment 
and control group due to sample size limitations. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive variables of the soy farmers in the treatment and 
control groups in Ghana  
Variable Treatment
(N=160)
Control 
(N=96)
Significance 
level p
Age (years) 39.2 37.8 .129
Sex (1=male, 2=female) 0.41 0.40 .740
Received production loan (0=no, 1=yes) 0.44 0.74 .000***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Table 5.3 provides data of the first gaming round. The average trust of all 
farmers participating was 4.79 coins out of 10 on average. For the treatment 
group this was 4.87 and the control group this was only 4.66 which is not 
significantly different. The group trust game gave a similar score: 4.70 coins 
were put in the pot on average. For the treatment group this was only 4.51, 
for the control group this was 4.71.  
 
Trust levels in the group and in the leadership, as derived from the debriefing 
questions, are quite high: 4.31 and 4.15 out of 5 for the treatment group. So 
although the participants indicate that they trust each other a lot in the survey, 
they did not send on average 8 or 9 of their 10 coins to their partner. Most 
participants chose to send only 3.4 or 5 coins in the first round.  
 
 
Table 5.3 Trust and risk determinants  
Variable Treatment
(N=160)
Control 
(N=96)
Significant 
Trust in group (survey) 4.31 4.63 * 
Trust in in leader (survey) 4.15 4.46  
Trust round 1 4.87 4.66  
Trust round 1 farm leader  5.31 4.97  
Group trust game 4.51 5.01  
Risk preference 1.80 1.66  
Consistency in risk game 0.76 0.94 *** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Development of trust 
In the four rounds that participants played, the first movers in the trust game 
adjusted their moves on the outcomes of previous rounds. So, when they had 
to decide which proportion of their endowment should be entrusted to their 
partner, the relative return of the previous round had a significant effect on 
that decision. A similar measurement of satisfaction with the previous round 
was previous profit, as defined by the amount of coins at the end of a round 
minus the amount of coins at the start of a round. A negative profit leads to 
almost a one coin reduction in the next round, and a positive profit almost led 
to a one coin increase. Interesting is that this effect declines over the rounds, 
the trust between the two partners stabilised. Also, a very high profit does not 
lead to significantly more trust in the next round in comparison with a 
moderate but positive profit. So a good trust relation is rooted in to positive 
experiences, but super positive returns had no additional effect.  
 
To measure the difference between the 2SCALE programme and the control 
area, we use the control group dummy in several regressions, controlling for 
risk preference, production loan, age and sex. All regression tables (4-6) are 
presented in Appendix 5. Our data does not show significant differences 
between farmers of the treatment and comparison groups considering trust, 
trustworthiness, or other in the trust game obtained variables. An explanation 
can be found in the fact that the comparison group was not an ideal control 
group. It turned out that the farmers of this group were also influenced by 
2SCALE interventions with spill over effects. This is of course a positive 
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element and indirect effect of the activities but for comparison of data, this is 
not an ideal situation.  
 
With several regression models we tried to further investigate the 
determinants of trust. The first round trust game data shows that there is a 
strong relation between trust, and own trustworthiness (Table A5.5, regression 
2, Appendix 5). The coefficient is large because the range of trust is from 0 to 
10 and the range of trustworthiness from 0 to 1. Expected return is also a 
highly significant determinant of trust (Table A5.5, regression 1, Appendix 5). 
The problem is that these variables are not exogenous. Both Trust and 
Trustworthiness measure if people are willing to send coins to each other. The 
Expected Return sheet is filled in most of the time after participants put some 
coins into their envelope. In fact, the relative expected return is another proxy 
for the trust in their partner. When including only exogenous variables, and 
consider Risk Preference and Production loan exogenous, Trust in round one 
has no significant determinants (Table A5.5, regression 3, appendix 5). So real 
exogenous predictors of trust levels of individuals cannot be determined with 
our data. Especially for risk preference this is surprising, and contrary to our 
hypothesis. In this table, the relation between an agricultural production loan 
and several trust variables is significant and positive. People who are eligible 
for a loan tend to send more coins in the trust games, and rate their group and 
leadership higher. In Table A5.6 (Appendix 5), we further investigate this 
relationship, with loan as dependant variable. It turns out that almost all 
variables are significant, and show small but positive effects. This means, that 
participants with a production loan of the credit union have higher 
interpersonal trust, group trust or risk preference, but expected less in return 
(negative coefficient of relative expected return). 
 
Trust decisions of participants were based on their personal preferences, and 
their estimate of the trustworthiness of their counterpart. But in the second, 
third, and fourth round they played with the same partner, so then they had 
information about the behaviour of the other. Because of the multiple rounds in 
the design of the trust game, we measure the trust update: The difference 
between the trust that a participant shows in round two and what he sent in 
round one.  
 
Expected was that a negative experience at the end of the first round, would 
lead to a lower trust next round. We used the variable ‘Relative Return’ as a 
determinant of this trust update. This is the amount that first movers received, 
divided by the amount of coins they have sent. Another relevant measurement 
of the satisfaction after a round is the profit. This is the amount of coins the 
first mover receives, minus the coins he sent. A relative return of 1 leads to a 
profit of 0, which means ending the game with 10 coins. The relative return 
has a significant positive influence on the trust update in the next round. 
However, this effect is declining in strength and significance. In the fourth 
round, the relative return of round 3 is no longer significant. Probably, the 
amount of coins that a participant wants to entrust has its limits. Or the two 
players reach a sort of exchange equilibrium. When using profit as a measure 
for satisfaction, we see hardly a significant influence on the trust update.  
Main findings games Ghana  
A large problem for smallholder farmers in Ghana is access to the market. The 
2SCALE programme intends to link smallholder farmers to processors in the 
Apex organisation. A problem in the functioning of value chains is distrust 
between the actors. The large majority of the game participants showed a high 
risk-aversion. We did not find a higher trust in the treatment area, compared 
to the comparison group. However there was also some kind of contamination 
of the comparison group, in which a similar cooperative support programme 
was run.  
 
The eligibility of farmers for an agricultural production loan is significantly 
correlated with the outcomes of the game data. On the field, these farmers are 
chosen through a personal assessment by their leaders, but it is possibly based 
on higher trust and risk preferences of these farmers. This same effect could 
work the other way around, farming on credit affects trust and risk 
preferences.  
 
With our results we can conclude that for building trust, especially avoiding 
negative experience is essential, but not enough. Translated to the programme 
discourse, extra services are appreciated, but a fair price, and no 
disappointments are the most important for a sustainable trust relation. 
Combining the intervention analysis with the trust update, we have indications 
for less feedback sensitivity for the trust update in the control area. Especially 
after negative profits, the control area showed less sensibility for that kind of 
feedback. This dealing with feedback of exchange partners can be considered 
as part of professional business skills.  
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5.4 Multi-agent Simulation model Ghana  
Approach 
A simulation of the soy value chain as described in the Section 5.2 has been 
implemented in NetLogo. The present section describes a summary of the 
simulation following the updated Overview, Design concepts, and Details 
(ODD) protocol developed by Grimm et al. (2010).  
 
Active entities in the simulation represent plots of land, farmers that cultivate 
the land to produce a soy, an farmers’ cooperative (APEX) that sells the 
produce on behalf of the farmers, another aggregator, and a small-scale local 
processor as described in Subsection 5.2.2 that contract farmers to deliver 
their produce. The processors that source soy from the APEX are not 
represented in the simulation; no data about the negotiations are available and 
the price is assumed to be aligned with general market prices for comparable 
volumes.  
 
From each group of 64 farmer agents one is given the role of group head (this 
is indicated in a state variable). The role of the group head is to decide about 
requesting loans for the group and distribution of the cost in case members 
default to redeem their loans. All farmers have a state variable pointing to 
their group head and a state variable comprising the set of group members. 
Farmers maintain trust in the other group members. All trust is represented as 
an experience-based subjective probability that the others will comply with the 
contracts. This group trust is an important factor in the decision whether or not 
to request a loan. Farmer agents also maintain trust they have in the suppliers 
of high quality seed. In case the results attained with high quality seed are 
disappointing, the trust is reduced and the farmers’ propensity to buy high 
quality seed is reduced.  
 
The APEX can have storage capacity to store soy in case of low market prices. 
The policy implemented in the simulation is that the APEX will sell a sufficient 
share of the recent harvest to cover the production cost, including a 
compensation for labour, and that the remaining part is stored until selling 
prices are at a satisfactory level. Farmers deliver not only to the APEX. They 
can also sell to local small-scale processor groups, which buy small volumes, 
but pay a good price. In addition they may sell on local markets if in urgent 
financial need, or, depending on their loyalty to the APEX, to other aggregators 
when they offer a high farm gate price. 
 
The value of natural conditions is equal for all farmers and thus affects the 
harvest of the entire cluster. The range of harvest fluctuations due to natural 
conditions is a parameter that can be set in the user interface. Similarly, 
market price is a system level variable that is randomly generated for each 
cropping season. Market prices are not correlated with harvested volumes in 
the simulation, since the world market price is assumed to be the dominant 
factor for price setting in the downstream value chain.  
 
Figure 5.2 represents a time step in the simulation cycle. The user may set 
parameters and intervene in the simulation by pressing the ‘DEFECT’ button to 
make the processor defect in paying the contracted farmers. For details on 
state variables, see the simulation programme. A simulation run typically 
includes 2,000 farmers (in groups of 64) a single APEX, and typically spans a 
period of twenty cropping seasons. 
 
A limitation of the present simulation is that no data are available about the 
choices farmers will make to grow soy or an alternative crop. The total area 
used for soy production remains constant. A further limitation is that no data 
are available on the negotiations and contracting by the APEX/group leaders 
with downstream processing companies. The simulations assume that no price 
regulating contracts are in place and that agreed prices fluctuate in accordance 
with global market prices. 
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Figure 5.2 Process overview of a time step representing a cropping season 
 
Descriptive results 
The agent-based simulation is parameterised with data collected in a value 
chain mapping mission and a baseline survey for the quantitative evaluation of 
2SCALE. Emergent properties to be observed are farm income and the supply 
of soy to the value chain. Key results are the following (Verwaart et al. 
forthcoming): 
 Under the default settings as represented in Table 5.4, the current soy 
supply and farm income tend to decrease by 20% and 30%, respectively, in 
the simulations; this is due to reduced group trust when, under bad growing 
conditions and low market prices, some farmers default in redeeming their 
loans and group members must support them. 
 Reliable supply and availability of high quality seed and inoculant increase 
soy supply by approximately 30 to 40% in the simulation; farm income is 
increased by 50% in the simulation, if reliable seed and inoculant are 
available (parameter settings: inoculant availability set equal to 100% and 
no cheating with seed occurs). 
 A sufficiently high farm income is required for purchasing high quality inputs 
and redeeming production loans, in order to sustainably realise the 
aforementioned improvements. The simulations reveal the following options 
to increase farm income. 
 If the minimal farm gate price is raised from GHS 700 to 1,000 per tonne, 
and the average price to GHS 1,300 instead of GHS 1,150 per tonne over the 
simulation period of ten years, average farm income increases by another 
50%, approximately. 
 When such price support cannot be realised, the use of APEX storage 
capacity to store part of the harvest and wait for high market prices may 
have a positive effect on farm income of 20%, on average. However, this 
intervention only has its effect when the skills of the weaker farmers are 
reinforced, in order to produce a sufficient volume for delayed sales and 
payments to the farmer, since a substantial part of the harvest must be sold 
on short term to cover the production cost. 
 Increased supply to local small-scale processors who can offer a good price, 
can, apart from the contributions to local economic development, have an 
additional positive effect on farm income. This effect is hard to quantify; the 
current demand of local groups is still small. A price of 4 GSH per kilogram is 
mentioned in the mission report, but no data are available about potential 
price evolution when local processing would grow. The price may be assumed 
to converge to global market prices when larger volumes are sourced for 
local production. 
Settings model Ghana  
Table 5.4 displays the default parameter settings. The ‘savings’ switch is by 
default set to false: farmers are assumed to spend their all revenue from a 
harvest during the following growing season on inputs for the next harvest and 
on cost of living.  
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Table 5.4 Default parameters  
Parameter Value Unit Parameter Value Unit 
Farms 2,304  Minimal-natural-conditions 0.5  
Minimal-farmgate-
price 
700 GHS/tonne Savings FALSE  
Maximal-farmgate-
price 
1,600 GHS/tonne Minimal-risk-aversion 0.002
5
1/GHS 
Local-market-price 700 GHS/tonne Maximal-risk-aversion 0.010
0
1/GHS 
Loan-standard 750 GHS/ha Minimal-initial-trust 0.8  
Cost-loan-insurance 200 GHS/ha Maximal-initial-trust 1  
Optimal-seed-cost 150 GHS/ha Minimal-loyalty 0.2  
Inoculant-cost 50 GHS/ha Maximal-loyalty 1  
Other-production-
cost 
250 GHS/ha APEX-storage 0 tonne 
Labour-cost 300 GHS/tonne APEX-price-advantage 5,000 % 
Transaction-cost-
market 
0 GHS Local processing groups:  
Basic-expected-
yield 
1.0 tonne/ha --Number-of-members 34  
Optimal-seed-factor 2.00  --Soy-demand-per-season 8 tonne 
Inoculant-factor 1.25  --Price-local-groups 4,000 GHS/tonne
Minimal-skills-factor 0.5  Positive-trust-update-
factor 
0.05  
Farm-area 0.4…0.
8
ha Negative-trust-update-
factor 
0.10  
 
Main findings Ghana  
As illustrated for single simulation runs in Figure 5.3, increased production and 
farm incomes require availability of reliable seed and inoculant, combined with 
stabilisation of revenues. The left-hand graphs (a) present results for the 
default parameter settings, with no availability of inoculant. The graphs in the 
middle (b) present results with full availability of inoculant. Harvest and income 
are increased but subject to fluctuations in market price and natural 
conditions. After seasons with bad revenue, many farmers have insufficient 
means to redeem their loans and buy new inputs. When the range of market 
price fluctuations is reduced from GHS 700 to 1,600/tonne to GHS 1,100 to 
1,200 per tonne, as in the right-hand graphs (c), total production and average 
income are significantly improved. The harvest variation over seasons is now 
solely caused by variation of natural conditions, such as rainfall, temperature, 
and pests.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Harvest and financial outcomes with default settings without 
availability of inoculant (a), default settings with availability of inoculant (b), 
and with inoculant and reduced price fluctuation of 1100 -1200 GHS/tonne 
instead of 700-1600 GHS/tonne (c). 
 
 
Simulations have also been run with APEX storage capacity up to 2000 tonnes, 
with a policy to limit sales to the volumes required to compensate the farmers 
for the production cost when market price is low, and postpone sales until 
market prices have recovered. This intervention has a positive effect on farm 
incomes only if the productivity of the weaker farmers is extended; sufficient 
supplies must be in stock to realise this policy. 
 
An effective approach to improve availability of means for purchasing of inputs 
for the next season is the development of local sales by developing local 
processing industries that can offer a good, stable price. It must be noted that 
in the present simulations a price of GSH 4/kg is used, as found in the field 
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mission. It is questionable if such a high price can persist when local 
processing industries develop. Figure 5.4 presents results of some simulation 
runs with local demand set to 100 tonnes, instead of the default of 8 tonnes, 
with and without sufficient availability of inoculant, and, in the right hand 
graphs (c), combined with the price stabilisation in other (non-local) channels 
as in figure 5.4. Price stabilisation in those channels has no additional effects 
on the average yields, but has a stabilising effect on farm incomes in the 
simulations (c). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Harvest and financial outcomes with demand from local 
processors offering 4 GHS/kg, increased to 100 tonnes (default 8 tonnes) 
under default market price fluctuation of 700-1600 GHS/tonne, respectively 
without (a) and with (b) availability of inoculant, and under reduced price (c). 
 
 
To summarise: results of the simulation runs show that it is essential to 
establish a stable and reliable supply of high quality seed and inoculant. In 
addition, price stabilising measures would increase average farm incomes. The 
following interventions have positive results in the simulations:  
 Reduction of the market price risk (possibly by price support or contracts). 
 As an alternative to price support or contracts: collective storage to absorb 
market price fluctuations, under the condition that skills and productivity of 
the weaker farmers are developed to produce a sufficient volume for delayed 
sales. 
 Development of local small-scale processing offering the farmers a good and 
stable price. 
5.5 Conclusions Ghana  
The games showed that a positive trust uptake after a positive experience and 
negative trust uptake after a negative experience. The agent-based simulation 
is initialised with data collected in a value chain mapping mission, a baseline 
survey for the quantitative evaluation of 2SCALE, and games played with 
farmer groups in Ghana. The results of the simulation runs showed that if 
stable and reliable supply of high quality seed and inoculant were available, 
considerable soy supply and farm income improvements can be realised, under 
the condition that market price fluctuations can be absorbed. If prices cannot 
be stabilised by price support or contracts offering a good minimum price, 
according to the simulation, collective storage and development of small-scale 
local processing can be good alternatives, provided that good inputs are 
available. 
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Conclusions 
6.1 Conclusion  
This study was conducted in the context of the 2SCALE programme which ran 
from 2012-2017. The programme was created by a consortium of partners and 
is supported by a grant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 
The goal of 2SCALE is to improve rural livelihoods and food and nutrition 
security in nine African countries. To this end, 2SCALE forges public-private 
partnerships, with private partners varying from local producer organisations 
and SMEs to large-scale companies such as seed companies, processors, and 
trading companies. As such the intervention aims to foster inclusive business 
aiming to involve low-income communities in inclusive value chains to alleviate 
poverty in developing countries. The 2SCALE programme specifically focussed 
on risk, trust and transaction costs as main elements of behavioural change in 
developing inclusive value chains. This approach requires an new impact 
assessment tool to measure changes in behaviour and value chain relations. 
We therefore designed the so called Value Chain (VC) Laboratory: an agent-
based simulation model in combination with experimental games on trust, risk 
and group behaviour. The aim of this study is twofold: i) to design and verify 
an alternative methodology ii) applied to two cases of 2SCALE for measuring 
its’ effects.  
 
Text box 6.1 summarises the two overall conclusions concerning the 2SCALE 
intervention and the VC-Lab methodology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Text box 6.1 Overall conclusions 
The 2SCALe intervention Kenya & Ghana:  
Promising intervention to potentially increase producers’ income whereby 
horizontal cooperation and vertical trust is key driver for success.  
The VC-Lab:  
Promising method for assessing behavioural and relational changes, to simulate 
decision making of value chain actors and to measure potential impact of VC 
development interventions. Further development is required. 
 
 
The main outcome of the VC-Lab is that the 2SCALE programme contributed to 
trust development over time in the Kenyan sorghum case. It is hard to show a 
trust development for the Ghana case as we could not compare with a valid 
comparison group. Repeated interactions between value chain agents ware 
likely to enforce inter-agent trust over time. In addition, in both cases, we 
identified in the games a positive trust uptake after a positive experience and 
negative trust uptake after a negative experience. This is comparable with 
repeated behaviour in commercial transactions within the value chain.  
 
The use of contractual arrangements and the confirmation to agreements 
within the public-private partnerships supported by 2SCALE shows a positive 
effect on the trust level. However, we could not identify whether incentive 
mechanisms have influence on the importance of contractual arrangements. 
Contrary to what we expected, the presence of contractual arrangements and 
higher levels of trust do not always lead to a change in risk attitude; most 
attitudes remains equally high in terms of risk aversion.  
 
It also appears that selling part of the produce to another party than the main 
buyer outside the contractual arrangement will always be part of the reality of 
the VC. Even if all conditions are favourable (i.e. high price offered, produce of 
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high quality, guaranteed market, training on agricultural skills offered), it 
appears that side-selling may occur. The reasons are legitimate and have 
nothing to do with trust, risk or disloyalty. It is a matter of urgent need of 
cash. As long as producers do not have any savings or cannot access loans, it 
is reasonable to argue that side-selling will occur.  
 
The results of the simulation runs show that if stable and reliable supply of 
improved seed and inoculant are available, considerable supply and farm 
income improvements can be realised, under the condition that price 
fluctuations can be absorbed by the market. Side sales (qualified as dis-loyalty 
to the buyer) will decrease as trust develops over time resulting in lower 
transaction costs, better quality compliance, and an improved value chain 
performance. In the end this is expected to result in higher prices in multiple 
stages of the value chain leading to a cycle of improved loyalty. For both 
Kenya and Ghana, the simulation runs indicate higher average farm income, 
and in the Ghana case also more stable production, in cases where less side 
sales occur, i.e. when a greater share of the produce is delivered on contracts 
(in Kenya), or marketed through a cooperative with storage capacity (in 
Ghana). 
 
The three tables below summarise the main findings of each case and the 
conclusions on the VC-lab methodology applied.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Main conclusions Kenya  
Kenya main results on 2SCALE intervention  
Trust of farmers is higher in Shalem (processor of intervention) compared to a) other 
processors and brokers and b) to farmers of comparison group which is a positive result of 
Shalem and IFDC interventions. Trust in Shalem caused by trustworthiness, offering a good 
price and training on production. 
No differences VCM game: free riding and investing in common pool resources. Low trust 
levels in other group members and negative behaviour of peers affects individual behaviour. 
Risk aversion is high and equally high among farmers in the treatment and comparison group. 
It is crucial for a stable contract supply to provide stable and high contract price against 
uncertain alternative. 
Improving skills leads to increased sorghum production and volumes and offering training 
leads to higher trust. 
(Good) Reputation and trustworthiness crucial for sustainable, inclusive and effective value 
chain. 
Approach IFDC can lead to higher farm incomes and profitable processor. Trust is key success 
factor. 
Shalem sorghum case is suitable for VC-Lab approach. 
 
 
Table 6.2 Main conclusions Ghana  
Ghana main results on 2SCALE intervention  
No differences treatment and comparison group (but contamination comparison group).  
No differences VCM game: free riding and investing in common pool resources. Low trust 
levels in other group members and negative behaviour of peers affects individual behaviour. 
Risk aversion is high and equally high among farmers in the treatment and comparison group. 
Positive relation between production loan, trust & attitude towards group leadership and risk 
aversion. 
A positive trust uptake after a positive experience and negative trust uptake after a negative 
experience 
If prices cannot be stabilised by price support or contracts offering a good minimum price, 
collective storage and development of small-scale local processing can be good alternatives, 
provided that good inputs are available. 
Ghana soy case is less suitable for VC-Lab approach. 
 
 
  
 Wageningen Economic Research Report 2017-031 | 55 
Table 6.3 Main conclusions VC-Lab Methodology  
Steps Pro  Limitations  
Value chain 
mapping  
Precondition for modelling 
including desk study  
Time and budget  Not all parameters for 
ABM are very clear at 
this stage  
Games on 
trust, risk and 
voluntary 
cooperation 
Games enable a good 
measurement of change in 
trust levels and risk attitude. 
No computerised 
game possible in 
these contexts;  
No anonymity, so 
possible socially 
desired behaviour;
High costs of psychical 
presence and real life 
game setting; 
Agent-based 
model  
Games provided crucial 
parameters for agent-based 
modelling. 
Simulation needed 
of behaviour of VC 
actors other than 
producer; 
Transaction costs 
challenging to define for 
all actors  
The agent-based model 
provided good simulations of 
trust and risk. 
No data over time 
complicating 
parameters for the 
model; Trend data 
needed  
Comparison group is too 
small or absent or not 
100% non-participating 
For simulating intervention 
impacts more data is needed 
(e.g. climate, other crops, 
trade -offs) 
Decision making 
on crop cultivation 
is not taken into 
account. 
 
 
6.2 Discussion  
A number of factors will be discussed that could have influenced the outcomes. 
The data collected during the games served as input for the model. With this 
approach, a number of constrains are observed since data collection among 
illiterate farmers can be troublesome. We chose to play simple games to 
enable farmers to understand. However, already in these simple games, 
inconsistencies are present and this is likely to increase if the games become 
more complex. Therefore, the following key points are important to outline:  
 The outcomes of the games should reflect the personal risk and trust 
preferences in an agricultural economic setting. Several validity concerns 
could be raised, of which the most important: is the behaviour in the game 
similar to real life, and is this behaviour similar when it concerns large 
amounts of money? For practical and logistic reasons, we chose to play with 
plastic coins, and relatively small amounts of money. In a round, a player 
could earn around USD 1. I 
 Data about trust, trust, honesty and risk attitude of sorghum and soy 
farmers in the areas under study are not available in literature. Therefore, 
we used trust, VCMC and risk games with a selected number of farmers. 
However, we could not compare these to trust, honesty, and risk attitude of 
other sorghum and soy farmers in respectively Kenya and Ghana, because 
country-wide data was lacking. Thus, results can be seen representative only 
for the farmers participating in the games.  
 It was impossible to collect data on trust, risk attitude and group behaviour 
over time (i.e. at a baseline and at the end of the intervention). This was due 
to a limitation in resources and because the design of the VC-Lab was not yet 
clear at the moment the baseline should have taken place. At the end of this 
study it is recommended to include various moments in time to measure 
attitudes. This is preferred to collecting data from a comparison group as 
they might be influenced by other factors (e.g. spill-over effects or receiving 
support from another intervention).  
 It is also challenging in the local context to guarantee total anonymity, or 
expel socially desired behaviour. In addition, participants could peek at their 
neighbour sometimes, and imitate their behaviour. As also discussed in the 
literature part, the trust game does also not separate pure trusting 
behaviour, and other preferences such as altruism or inequality aversion may 
intervene.  
 It can be sensitive and jeopardising existing relationships between value 
chain actors when conducting the games in a real setting. We therefore 
simulated behaviour of the traders and processors instead of playing the 
games with them and the farmers in one group. A computerised setting 
would allow for playing with all the VC actors at the same time but the 
contexts under study do not allow for playing games with a computer. The 
participants should behave as natural as possible and the majority is not 
used to a computer.  
 In behavioural research, framing, hinting or steering can influence the 
results. Because we worked with participants using different local languages, 
and therefore also different translators, language framing could have 
influenced the results. For example, for the word ‘send’ in the trust game, 
the meaning and implication totally changes when it is translated as ‘donate’, 
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‘invest’, or ‘move’. Even while the instructions were typed out word by word, 
a literal translation cannot be fully guaranteed because many English words 
have no local equivalent.  
 The comparison groups identified in this study have also been exposed to 
some elements of the interventions. For example, various farmers in the 
control group in Kenya were already supplying via Shalem. For Ghana, some 
of the farmers received already support via another programme managed by 
one of the implementers.  
 Selection of farmers in comparison group via the farm leader might have 
influenced the outcomes at trust level, so it is possible that the farmers in 
the control already had high levels of trust. Thus, indicating that if farmers 
were selected random the actual trust was most likely to be lower.  
 The results of the multi agent model are only limited to the crop under study 
(i.e. sorghum and soy). It does not say anything about resource competition 
at farm level with other crops that might be (more) interesting to cultivate 
(e.g. when market prices are higher for these crops than the crops under 
study). 
 It was difficult to have a concrete parameter for transaction costs s and 
measuring change over time. Following the conceptual framework we can 
draw conclusions on expected transaction costs s following changes in trust 
and risk attitude. However, we did not have actual figures on transaction 
costs s as it is challenging to translate these into concrete figures in the 
contexts under study.  
6.3 Outlook  
There are several reason why our insights into the outcomes and impact of 
interventions aiming to achieve inclusive sustainable value chains are still 
rather limited. Most studies focus attention only on the primary production 
stage, while devoting little attention to changes in relationships and 
governance regimes throughout the value chain (Lemeilleur 2014). Moreover, 
implications for intra-household (gender) issues and for value chain 
cooperation and governance are scarcely addressed (Terstappen et al. 2013). 
The empirical evidence generated by impact studies remains ambivalent and 
focusses mostly on directly observable economic effects (prices, yields, wages, 
sales). Sustainability is usually only considered within farm boundaries 
(Blackman and Rivera 2010). Far less attention is given to systematic 
verification of the underlying assumptions for achieving impact, to the 
secondary effects of certification at farm, village and regional level, and to the 
possible behavioural implications of certification (e.g. changes in risk attitudes, 
willingness to invest, bargaining power, trust, etc.). These behavioural and 
dynamic effects receive key attention in interactive impact assessments. 
 
In order to capture these value chain interactions, impact analysis should be 
based on interactive approaches that are able to reveal behavioural drivers and 
constraints for value chain coordination. There are several attempts with 
experiments designed in a real-time multi agency system environment 
(including farmers, workers, traders, processors and retailers) and be 
supported by agent-based modelling (ABM) to assess possible alternative 
outcomes (Tykhonov et al. 2008; Latynskiy and Berger 2017; Hidayest and 
Nurhasanah 2014) but without application to a concrete intervention such as 
2SCALE. The application of an alternative impact methodology remain scarce 
and the way the VC-Lab of this study is designed is quite unique. The 
underlying study concludes that the designed and validated VC-Lab proves to 
be a good method for measuring and evaluation the key assumptions related 
to trust and risk underlying the ToC. There are various recommendations for 
further improvement and lessons to keep in mind:  
 For measuring changes over time it is recommended to play the games at 
the start of an intervention in order to measure trust at the baseline and to 
play the games after a certain time (midterm) and at the end of the 
intervention. This will generate a more dynamic overview of risk and trust 
development over time.  
 Some of the input for the multi agent model originates from the quantitative 
baseline survey by ARS/ IAR. Since they will conduct an impact study among 
the same farmers, this will give great output for the multi agent model. 
Therefore, to generate alternative up to date scenarios with these data is 
recommended.  
 The current design of the games only entitles to collect data between the 
farmers and the buyers. Therefore, the upstream relationships between 
trader and processor could not be adequately studied. Since there are only a 
few buyers, and a detailed qualitative case study of these relations is 
recommended.  
 With the model, the impact can be estimated of alternative intervention 
strategies, such as an incentive system for sorghum quality. Ranking these 
strategies according to increasing effectiveness, e.g. farmer income or total 
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supply chain profit, can help in designing potentially effective intervention 
strategies prior to their implementation. Thus, the model can be helpful in 
decreasing failure costs of interventions in sorghum production in Kenya. 
However, the model can be adapted to other commodities and other 
countries where trust between farmers and processors and mutual trust 
within the farmers’groups play important roles in the supply chain. In this 
way, the model is considered a valuable tool for analysing inclusive business 
approaches in development aid programmes. 
 It is recommend for further development of the VC-Lab to include data of the 
following parameters:  
- Decision making, more specifically: what makes a producer to decide 
whether to produce and what to produce; 
- Other crops, weather and market prices & certain trade-offs with the crop 
under study; 
- Payment schedule (when are producers paid, how long after transaction 
and how); 
- Operationalisation of transaction costs.  
 The VC-Lab and specifically the ABM can be used to asses ex-ante impact by 
simulation interventions and potential impact. It can provide inputs for 
policy, design of interventions and can feed relevant discussions and decision 
making processes.  
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Appendix 1 Theory of Change 2SCALE 
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Appendix 2 Value chain analysis potato Ethiopia 
(summary) 
Figure A2.1 presents a brief overview of the main actors in the value chain and 
their numbers. In addition it gives an indication of the selling price of the 
farmers and the agents in terms of price in Birr (ETB) per kg.  
 
 
 
Figure A2.1 The value chain  
 
Key actors and roles 
The major actors in the potato value chain actors include input (seed, fertiliser, 
fungicide) suppliers, producers, wholesalers, brokers, retailers and consumers. 
Inputs 
Most farmers in Ethiopia use seed potatoes from their own stocks or these are 
bought from fellow farmers. Many issues are related to this informal supply 
chain, such as limited quality measures resulting in poor quality starting 
material: 
 Late blight is common 
 Too small tubers 
 Damaged tubers  
 Unknown origin or variety.  
 
In addition, the Ethiopian Agriculture Research Organization (EARO) has 
started a seed potato production scheme. This is located in Holeta. The 
outcome of this scheme is only to provide a limited number of improved seeds 
to the farmers. As a result, not all farmers are able to use the improved seeds.  
 
For some of the interviewed farmers, an important supplier is Solagrow, which 
provides inputs, including improved varieties. In Holeta they have stored their 
stock of improved seeds. The seeds are newly introduced varieties that are 
suitable for processing. 
 
Fertilisers are normally distributed via the agro shops in each kabede (town 
level). Farmers are able to buy the fertilisers there and they can make use of 
input financing. Only a small share of the farmers does this. This service is 
arranged at Woreda level (sub district) by the local government.  
Farmers 
The next major potato value chain actors following input suppliers are potato 
growers. They are generally smallholder farmers with different land sizes. 
USAIDS agricultural sample survey estimated the number of Ethiopian 
smallholder potato growing farmers at 1,386,670 in the 2006/07 production 
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year, of whom 430,582 were in the SNNPR. This implies that 31% of potato 
producers in 2006/07 were farmers in the SNNPR. 
 
Potato growers are the major actors who perform most of the value chain 
functions right from farm inputs preparation on their farms or procurement of 
the inputs from other sources to post harvest handling and marketing. The 
major value chain functions that potato growers perform include ploughing, 
ridging, planting; fertilisation, weeding, pest/disease control, harvesting and 
post-harvest handling. The most difficult function according to the farmers is 
ridge making, since it is labour intensive. 
 
In most of the potato growing areas, the producers transport their potato to 
the nearby markets be they rural or urban centres. Means of transportation 
varies among locations but predominately on pack animals (donkey). A donkey 
costs the farmers about ETB 15. One donkey can take 2 quintals. 
 
The costs are very difficult for the farmers to estimate. But for 1ha per season 
they think the following is required: 
 100 kg urea for ETB 3,000 
 100 kg DAP for ETB 3,000 
 Seeds 20 quintal (2 tonnes) for ETB 8,000  
 Total costs ETB 14,000.  
 
The inputs are bought via the cooperation/union. The fertilisers come at a 
subsidised price arranged by the government. They can get it at the 
agricultural office at the Woreda (village). 
 
Given the above yield of 80 quintal (8 tonnes) per hectare, we assume a 
revenue of ETB 24,000. So the farmer can make ETB 10,000 from 1ha of 
potato production. This excludes labour of the farmer (no external labour is 
hired) and excludes the costs for pesticides.  
 
Brokers play a crucial role in the potato marketing system of Ethiopia by 
facilitating potato transaction through the linking producers with traders, a 
wholesaler with another wholesaler, and wholesalers with retailers. The brokers 
tend to control and fix prices, creating price symmetry. The brokers often work 
in an unregulated and informal way. The brokers buy potatoes at rural markets 
or at the farm gate.  
Table A2.1 Profit per hectare from potato farming using improved seeds  
 Quantity Old situation 
Amount in ETB per ha
With 2SCALE  
A) Costs    
Labour  - - 
Seeds 2,000kg 8,000 - 
Fertilisers  2,000kg 6,000 - 
Mechanisation service  - 1,600 
Other costs (transport)  600 600 
Total costs  14,600 2,200 
    
B) Returns    
-kg 80 quintal (8,000kg)   
-price per kg  ETB3    
Total revenue   24,000  24,000 
    
Profit (B-A)  9,400 21,800 
*own labour, not included in the cost price calculation  
 
Processor 
Potato is commonly consumed in the form of boiled and cooked meals in 
different traditional dishes or 'wot'. Recently, consuming potato chips, crisps, 
and roasted potatoes are becoming common practice, especially in cities such 
as Addis Ababa, Hawassa, Adama and Mekele. In other urban areas it is also 
usually consumed mixed with other vegetables as a salad. Large-scale potato 
processing is non-existent in Ethiopia. Few processors were interviewed during 
the survey although they could not tell about the volume of potato processed 
as the product is sold mixed with different products such as vegetables. Hence, 
it is hardly possible to report on the volume of potato processed in the study 
areas. Those few processors interviewed said that they prefer large size 
potatoes for processing. Consistent with other research findings, the Jalene 
variety is preferred for processing in Hawassa and Shashemene. Supermarkets 
started to sell potato products such as chips and crisps. In large cities such as 
Addis Ababa, it is common to see hotels, restaurants and cafes prepare French 
Fries.  
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In addition: Solagrow has the ambition to invest in processing. Good varieties are 
needed to process in descent volumes.  
Retail 
Many potatoes are brought to the urban markets in Addis Ababa. However, the 
potatoes produced near Wolkite appear to remain in the region. Most potatoes 
are sold on the markets in the rural areas (twice a week). In nearly every 
Kabede there is a small market where the farmers can sell their produce. At 
these markets rural consumers buy their produce. Also buyers come to collect 
larger quantities of produce for the urban markets in Wolkite and further away.  
 
In Wolkite there is a market twice a week. On this weekend female vendors 
sell the potatoes. The potatoes are presented on the floor and grouped in 
bunches of 1 kg. They are sold for ETB 5-7 per kg, depending on the season. 
The female vendors told us that they buy their potatoes (1 quintal) from the 
collectors that pick the potatoes from the farm or rural markets.  
 
At the market in Wolkite mainly rural people come to buy their fresh produce, 
but also shop and restaurant owners come to buy produce. But is also possible 
that they buy directly from the collectors.  
 
In addition to these markets, Addis Ababa is the main market for ware 
potatoes. Merkato, Shola and Piazza market are the biggest open air markets 
in Ethiopia and produce from the entire country is traded here, where also 
large volumes of potatoes arrive. However, there are only a small number of 
potato wholesalers on this market. They are said to buy directly from farmers. 
The place where they buy potatoes differs from season to season. From June 
to October they buy from the southern part of Ethiopia, which can be 
Shashemene. Then, from October to February the main sourcing is from the 
Aselle and from the northern part of the country. These areas are mainly 
Menagesha and Gojam.  
From these markets many potatoes are sold to small shop owners and 
restaurants. Also some consumers come and buy small quantities of potatoes. 
Hotels often have a dedicated supply contract with traders that supply the 
hotel a number of times per week. The hotels use the potatoes as fresh ware 
potatoes, but they also process them for French fries or mashed potatoes.  
 
In Addis there is also an increasing number of supermarkets aimed at the 
expatriates or the high-end consumers. Some of them sell potatoes, often 
sourced from the main open markets, and presented washed and clean. They 
do not sell any chips from local produce. However, they do sell imported chips 
imported from the Middle East (such as Lay’s ) and the also sell deep-frozen 
potato fries from abroad.  
Trust, risk and transaction costs  
Trust  
Currently trust is not an issue. There are no transactions between Solagrow 
and the visited farmers. Solagrow only provides inputs (fertilisers, seed 
potatoes) and does not provide the market linkage. However, some farmers 
mentioned that Solagrow was going to buy their potatoes, but that they were 
not able to buy them yet. For the farmers it was not a problem to sell the 
potatoes on the local market since they got the inputs for free and only paid 
little money (ETB 1,600 per ha) for the mechanisation series.  
 
At the moment the farmers are waiting to be supplied with new inputs, but it is 
not sure if they will get this since the potato seeds have been destroyed during 
the unrest. As a result, the farmers might start production with the 
conventional seeds, and will only use the mechanisation services. However, the 
land needs to be prepared as soon as possible (within the next 3 to 4 weeks), 
otherwise the farmers are too late. Note that this might affect the credibility of 
Solagrow). 
Risk  
The main identified risks for the current market are :  
 It is not possible to bring the potatoes to the market due to poor roads 
 Decreased sales due to lower demand 
 There are insufficient volumes of improved potatoes seeds available.  
Transaction costs 
For the farmers the transactions costs are high if they sell at the rural markets. 
It costs them a full day to go there and to bring 1 or 2 quintals to the market. 
Rural consumers often only buy small quantities. In addition, the farmer needs 
to pay for the transport to the local market. This can go up to ETB 15 per 
donkey ride. 
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Appendix 3 Simulation for the harvest-price relation 
Kenya 
To test for the effect of assumed relations between local harvest and farm gate 
price, additional simulations were run with the following options 
 zero correlation between natural conditions and price 
 inverse relation between price and natural conditions: minimal natural 
conditions --> maximal price, vice versa  
 with 50/50 mix of the above settings  
and two additional observables: 
 the accumulated total shortage over seasons in which a shortage occurred, 
out of twenty growing seasons (shortage of contract deliveries with respect 
to the volume to be delivered to the brewery) 
 the number of seasons in which such a shortage occurred, out of twenty 
seasons. 
 
90 simulations were run for each of the following scenarios: 
 honesty parameters taken from the games, default skills factor, and 5,000 1.
tonnes to be delivered 
 rather dishonest parameter setting to test for sensitivity to this parameter 2.
 rather honest parameter setting to test for sensitivity to this parameter 3.
 honesty parameters taken from the games, increased farmer skills factor, 4.
and 5,000 tonnes to be delivered 
 honesty parameters taken from the games, increased farmer skills factor, 5.
and 5,000 tonnes to be delivered 
 honesty parameters taken from the games, increased farmer skills factor, 6.
and 5,000 tonnes to be delivered 
 
Each set of 90 simulations comprised: 
 30 runs with zero correlation between natural conditions and price 
 30 runs with inverse relation between price and natural conditions  
 30 runs with price determined for 50% by the inverse relation 
 
With respect to the zero correlation case, the results show a relevant increase 
of the occurrence and volume of shortages if a we assume a 100% inverse 
relation. These shortage in particular seasons occur despite the increased 
volume delivered on contracts on average; they are is due to side-selling. 
 
However, there is little difference between outcomes for 50% and 100% 
randomness. An assumption of 50% dependence of the price on natural 
conditions makes no great difference in the occurrence and volumes of 
shortages due to side-selling. A conclusion is that it will be relevant to collect 
data on the relation between total harvest and farmgate price and include this 
relation in the simulation only if it the local harvest is the main factor (>50%) 
determining the local farmgate price. 
 
A point to be noticed is that in the current simulation only two reasons for 
side-selling are implemented: a farmer’s urgent need for cash and opportunism 
in case of high market prices. There might be other reasons not to deliver the 
entire harvest on contracts in case of bad natural conditions, such as increased 
demand for home consumption or some need to keep a fixed volume in stock. 
 
Furthermore, the differences between simulations with rather dishonest and 
rather honest agents stress the disruptive effects of side-selling on the system, 
as concluded before. 
 
The results from runs with increased skills factors show that increasing the 
skills can increase the production and offer opportunities for greater contracts, 
but that skills improvement as such does not affect the occurrence of 
shortages due to side-selling.  
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Table A3.1 Average results from 30 simulations 
Scenario  Harvest-price relation Accumulated 
shortage over 
10 yrs
# seasons 
with 
shortage
Game data, 5000 tonnes to be 
delivered,  
basic skills 
No correlation 1,148 2.0
50/50 1,972 2.6
100% inverse relation 2,925 4.7
  
Game data, 10000 tonnes to be 
delivered, improved farmers’ 
skills 
No correlation 4,046 2.9
50/50 5,161 3.2
100% inverse relation 7,737 5.0
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Appendix 4 Detailed information sorghum value 
chain, Kenya
The annual production of sorghum in Kenya varies between 173,000 tonnes 
and 254,000 tonnes. The average yield is around 0.57-0.74 tonne per ha. 
Interviewed stakeholders indicated that there are an estimated 500,000 
sorghum farmers. This means that they produce sorghum on an average area 
of 0.3-0.5 hectares. This roughly equals 1-2 acres. Most farmers produce twice 
per year on small plots of land which are rain fed. However a few farmers 
produce sorghum on larger plots going up to 10-15 acres (4-6 ha).  
 
Good farmers are estimated to produce 20-25 bags per acre per season. 1 bag 
contains 90 kgs of sorghum.  
 
 
Table A4.1 Area harvested, production and calculated yield for Sorghum in 
Kenya per annum  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Area harvested (ha)  173,172   225,782  254,125  223,799  189,442 
Production (tonnes)  99,000   164,066  159,877  166,627  138,533 
Yield (tonnes per ha)  0.57   0.73  0.63  0.74  0.73 
Source: FAOstat  
 
Season  
A key area of sorghum production is the Eastern Province. Especially around 
Meru there are many sorghum farmers. The region around Meru has many 
different micro climates due to its mountainous character, resulting in large 
differences in temperature and rainfall. This results in large variations between 
the yields of the different farmers, depending on the location. There are two 
sorghum seasons per year. The first one starts in May with harvest in 
September. The second season starts in October with harvest in March 
(Table A4.2).  
 
 
Table A4.2 Harvest calendar upper midland zone in the Eastern Province 
Season Planting 
period – 
start 
Planting 
period - 
end 
Sowing / 
Planting 
rate seed 
Sowing / 
Planting 
rate unit 
Harvesting 
period - 
start 
Harvesting 
period - 
end 
First  15/03 31/03 7-10 kg/ha 01/09 30/09 
Second  01/10 31/10 7-10 kg/ha 01/03 15/04 
Source: FAOstat  
 
 
Sorghum is traditionally produced by farmers for domestic use to make 
porridge and ugali. Nowadays sorghum is increasingly used for the production 
of beer for the poor (called Senator Keg). For this white sorghum is required 
and a specific variety is preferred (Gadam). Traditionally, sorghum is a ‘poor 
men’s meal’, for it is quite cheap to produce and buy. Because of this image, 
it’s a challenge to extend consumption beyond the Bottom of the Pyramid 
(BoP) target group.  
 
Table A4.3 gives an overview of the different costs for 1 acre of sorghum 
production. This calculation has a modest revenue of 18 bags with 90 kg of 
sorghum and assumes that farmers use certified seed. In case the farmers use 
traditional seed, the price is only KES 150 compared to a price of KES 800 per 
acre. The cost price for 1,680 kg of sorghum production is calculated at KES 12 
per kg, or KES 19,780 per acre. The yield is expected to be 20% lower (an 
estimated) 3-4 bags with conventional seed though. And although lower, there 
is still profit with conventional seed. This season there is a minimum selling 
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price of KES 25 per kg agreed upon with Shalem. If volumes of the farmer 
group increase the farmers group can get a better price (up to KES 28 per kg).  
 
 
Table A4.3 Profit per acre from sorghum farming using certified and 
conventional seeds in KES  
 Item Activity Unit Unit 
price 
Total price 
with certified 
seeds 
Total price 
with 
conventional 
seeds 
Costs Labour  Ploughing 5 300 1,500 1,500
  Planting 5 300 1,500 1,500
  1st weeding 5 300 1,500 1,500
  2nd weeding 6 300 1,800 1,800
  Harvesting 4 300 1,200 1,200
 Inputs Seeds 4 200 800 150
  Fertilizers  3,600 3,600
  Pesticides  1,200 1,200
 After 
harvest 
Threshing 18 200 3,600 3,600
  Bags 18 40 720 720
  Weighing and 
packing 
18 20 360 360
 Miscellaneous costs  2,000 2000
 Total costs   19,780 19,130
Sales  Yield in kg   1,62
0 
25 40,500 32,400*
Profit    20,720 13,270
*20% less compared to the estimated 1620 kg is 1296kg. 
Source: IFDCs own calculations, 2014 
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Appendix 5 Detailed information regressions soy, 
Ghana 
To measure the difference between the 2SCALE programme and the control 
area, we use the control group dummy in several regressions, controlling for risk 
preference, production loan, age and sex (Table A5.1 in below). Our data does 
not show significant differences of trust, trustworthiness, or other in the trust 
game obtained variables. The risk preference in the control area is somewhat 
lower, but not significant. As discussed before, relatively more participants had a 
loan in the control area, and regression 5 and 6 show a significant relation 
between risk preference and a production loan. This makes sense because taking 
a loan requires the acceptance of certain risks. The expected effect was: lower 
trust levels in Zabzugu-Tatale because of not participating in the 2SCALE 
programme. The however data does not support this. An explanation could be 
the limited influence that those kind of programmes have on individual trust 
preferences. Another one could be the so called contamination of the control 
group. In this control area, the Zabzugu-Tatale district, the 2SCALE is only 
starting up partnering with local partner SEND Ghana, and only initial meetings 
have taken place. But SEND Ghana already runs another programme in this area 
called Food Security through Cooperative in Northern Ghana in which where 
cooperatives are supported. The 2SCALE programme can build on existing 
cooperative structures, and it’s added value will mainly be external: inclusion in 
value chains, and brokering with banks and aggregators. For things such as 
mutual trust, and trustworthiness of farmers inside the cooperative, this was not 
an ideal control group.  
 
Table A5.1 Regression between treatment and control group.  
VARIABLES 1 
Trust  
 
Rnd1 
2 
Own 
Trustworthiness  
Rnd1 
3 
Relative expected 
return  
Rnd1 
4 
Group Trust 
5 
Risk preference 
6 
Production loan 
last year 1= yes 
7 
Profit  
 
Rnd1 
Control area -0.30 -0.04 -0.00 0.37 -0.32* 0.30*** -0.01 
 (0.27) (0.03) (0.17) (0.33) (0.16) (0.06) (0.38) 
Risk preference 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03  0.09*** 0.13 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.07) (0.13)  (0.03) (0.15) 
Production loan last year 1= yes 0.65** 0.04 -0.39** 0.60* 0.56***   
 (0.27) (0.03) (0.17) (0.33) (0.16)   
Age 0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 -0.01* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Sex Female =1 0.43 -0.01 0.08 -0.36 -0.44*** -0.02 0.34 
 (0.26) (0.03) (0.16) (0.32) (0.16) (0.06) (0.38) 
Constant 3.68*** 0.33*** 1.84*** 4.22*** 2.16*** 0.20 0.38 
 (0.54) (0.05) (0.34) (0.65) (0.30) (0.13) (0.78) 
N 240 238 238 240 240 240 243 
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The influence of peoples risk perception on their decisions in the trust game 
cannot be derived from this data (see Table A5.2). Age has also no effect on 
the amount of trust, expected return or risk preference. Female participants do 
not show lower or higher trust, but have a significant lower risk preference. In 
table 07 we combine all the first round or single shot variables related to trust 
and expectation, to further investigate determinants of trust. The first round 
trust game data shows that there is a strong relation between trust, and own 
trustworthiness (Table A5.2, regression 2). The coefficient is large because the 
range of trust is from 0 to 10 and the range of trustworthiness from 0 to 1. 
Expected return is also a highly significant determinant of trust (regression 1). 
The problem is that these variables are not exogenous. Both Trust and 
Trustworthiness measure if people are willing to send coins to each other. The 
Expected Return sheet is filled in most of the time after participants put some 
coins into their envelope. In fact, the relative expected return is another proxy 
for the trust in their partner. When including only exogenous variables, and 
consider Risk Preference and Production loan exogenous, Trust in round one 
has no significant determinants (regression 3). So real exogenous predictors of 
trust levels of individuals cannot be determined with our data. Especially for 
risk preference this is surprising, and contrary to our hypothesis. In this table, 
the relation between an agricultural production loan and several trust variables 
is significant and positive. People who are eligible for a loan tend to send more 
coins in the trust games, and rate their group and leadership higher. In Table 
A5.3, we further investigate this relationship, with loan as dependant variable. 
 
 
Table A5.2 Determinants of trust  
VARIABLES 1 
Trust  
 
Rnd1 
2 
Trust  
 
Rnd1 
3 
Trust  
 
Rnd1 
4 
Own 
Trustworthiness 
Rnd1 
5 
Relative 
expected return 
Rnd1 
6 
Trust Round 
farmer leader 
7 
Group Trust 
8 
Questionnaire 
trust in group 
9 
Questionnaire 
trust in leader 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Sex Female =1 0.13 0.50** 0.43 -0.01 0.08 0.49* -0.37 -0.15 -0.00 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.03) (0.16) (0.28) (0.32) (0.10) (0.12) 
Production loan last year 
1= yes 
0.61** 0.43* 0.54** 0.03 -0.42*** 0.65** 0.69** 0.25** 0.25** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.03) (0.16) (0.28) (0.32) (0.10) (0.12) 
Risk preference 0.11 0.16 0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.01) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05) 
Started as first mover 0.00 -0.26 -0.20 0.01 -0.33** 0.05 -0.14 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.02) (0.16) (0.27) (0.31) (0.10) (0.11) 
Exp. Return Rnd1 0.20***         
 (0.03)         
Own Trustworthiness Rnd1  4.20***        
  (0.62)        
Constant 2.43*** 2.40*** 3.66*** 0.30*** 2.02*** 4.37*** 4.45*** 4.24*** 4.41*** 
 (0.52) (0.54) (0.54) (0.05) (0.34) (0.59) (0.66) (0.21) (0.25) 
N 240 238 240 238 238 240 240 239 238 
R-squared 0.22 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A production loan is essential for most farmers in the Northern Region of 
Ghana to buy agricultural inputs, and to pay for tractor services. Farmers in a 
community can apply for a loan together with other members of their 
cooperative. But not everybody applies, and not everybody is eligible. These 
decision who can apply is mostly made by the cooperative leader, he submits a 
list of names of members to the credit union. It is interesting to see if there is 
a relation with the data that is derived from our behavioural games. In Table 
A5.2 we already analysed the relation of trust values and the production loan. 
The question to the participant was: did you receive an agricultural production 
loan of the credit union last year? Table A5.3 presents the outcome of several 
Probit regressions displaying the marginal effects. Almost all variables are 
significant, and show small but positive effects. Participants with a production 
loan of the credit union had higher interpersonal trust, group trust or risk 
preference, but expected less in return (negative coefficient of relative 
expected return). 
 
 
Table A5.3 Different Probit regressions with production loans (PL)  
VARIABLES PL 1= Yes PL 1= Yes PL 1= Yes PL 1= Yes PL 1= Yes PL 1= Yes PL 1= Yes 
Age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sex Female =1 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Trust Round1 0.03*       
 (0.02)       
Questionnaire trust in group  0.10**      
  (0.04)      
Questionnaire trust in leader   0.07*     
   (0.04)     
Group Trust    0.03**    
    (0.01)    
Relative expected return Round1     -0.10**   
     (0.04)   
Risk preference      0.09***  
      (0.03)  
Own Trustworthiness Rnd1       0.16 
       (0.17) 
N 252 251 250 252 249 240 250 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix 6 Programme validation workshop Kenya 
Programme Validation workshop 2SCALE – Shalem study 
Meru, May 24, 2017  
 
 
09.00  Arrival  
 
09.30  Official start, introduction by Ruth & Christine Kanana 
 
09.45  Short introduction of all participants (names) 
 
10.00  Objectives & expectations & programme of the day  
 
10.15  Presentation: results of the study (games) Youri & Christine 
 
11.00  Coffee & tea break  
 
11.15  Group work on trust  
 
11.45  Presentation of outcomes group work 
 
12.30  Lunch  
 
13.30  VCM Game  
 
14.30  Discussion farmers & Shalem on way forward  
 
15.30  Conclusions and Recap  
 
16.00  Closing  
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Appendix 7 Report validation workshop Kenya 
May 2017 Field Report, Sorghum Partnership- Kenya, Activity: Support 
Activity 4: Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Programme level M&E – Value chain games feedback session with IFDC, 
Wageningen Economic Research (WUR), Shalem management and a selected 
sample of farmer representatives 
 
Dates: 23rd to 25th May 2017 
Participants 
 10 farmer leaders who participated in the value chain games exercise in 1.
2016 as the treatment groups 
 10 farmer leaders from other Shalem groups 2.
 Ruth Kinoti – Managing Director – Shalem Investments Ltd. 3.
 Christine Kanana – Training Coordinator - Shalem Investments Ltd. 4.
 Daniel Kisengese – Agronomist- Shalem Investments Ltd. 5.
 Joy Nkatha – Consultant - Shalem Investments Ltd. 6.
 Beth Ntinyari - Attachee - Shalem Investments Ltd. 7.
 Patrick Boro – Capacity Strengthening Specialist - 2SCALE  8.
 Gabriel Olengo – Partnership Facilitator - 2SCALE 9.
 Ruth Kamunya – M&E and Database Specialist – 2SCALE 10.
 Christine Plaisier- Wageningen Economic Research 11.
 Youri Dijkxhoorn – Wageningen Economic Research  12.
 
The objectives of the feedback session was to communicate the findings of the 
value chain games that were conducted in 2016. The games measuring risk 
attitude, (mutual) trust & collective action were conducted with 31 farmer 
groups of 16 participants to identify changes in trust and risk attitude. The 
feedback from the value chain games was planned for the representatives from 
the 10 groups that participated in the games under the treatment group of 
farmers, and additional number of farmers who are influential in disseminating 
the feedback down to the grassroots levels of the groups. The Shalem team 
was also represented as well as the 2SCALE team so as to discuss the results 
as a team. Before the start of the session, the farmers had the following as 
some of their long term goals and objectives as farmers of sorghum;  
 
Farmer goals and objectives: 
 Increased sorghum productivity at farm level 
 Increased sorghum delivery to Shalem 
 Improved household income and revenue 
 Improved savings and investments 
 Improved standards of living cum ensure household food security 
 
The session was conducted through powerpoint presentations and also through 
group discussions that resulted to the following discussions, guided by selected 
questions. 
 
Trust Levels between the treatment and control groups: 
Trust in Shalem by farmers in the treatment group was significantly higher 
than trust of the control group farmers in their normal buyers and trust in new 
buyers. Trust of farmers in the control group in their normal buyer was 
significantly higher than trust in a new broker. 
 
Reasons for such an outcome are;  
 Time line- Shalem has natured the group’s overtime and they have 1.
developed a sense of natural ownership thus high trust. 
 The benefits gained from Shalem as a farmer apex body that organises for 2.
transport, aggregation, input provision, credit services and trainings 
(farmers and coaches). These has increased farmer trust. 
 Assured market irrespective of volume levels also gives the same impact. 3.
 
Discussions around the above outcomes; 
 Farmers using adequate inputs and are involved in trainings are likely to 1.
enter into contracts with Shalem Investments due to the trust earned and 
in return the volumes delivered would be high and of good quality. 
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 In the first season some side-selling occurs by contracted farmers who are 2.
in urgent financial needs before the harvest is delivered. This doesn’t mean 
absolute mistrust but the pressure to meet their immediate needs. 
 For some seasons, if market price exceed the contract price, new farmers 3.
would side sell some of the harvest but deliver some Shalem to preserve 
the name and trust. 
 In the subsequent seasons side-selling reduces since established farmers 4.
show little urgency for financial needs before the harvest is delivered but 
they can get loans from Shalem and from alternative sources like MFIs. 
 
From the various group activities, the farmer representatives had the following 
to say as guided by the questions that were given to them; 
 
Group work on trust; The farmers working in three groups had the following 
responses to the various questions posed to them; 
 
Question 1: What can Shalem do to increase your trust? 
 Offering sustainable training to farmers through field days 1.
 Maintain input supplies and discounted prices; e.g offering wholesale prices 2.
 Production price time utility 3.
 Regular visits to the farmers through trainings 4.
 Increase facilitators to cover the many groups 5.
 Provide inputs to farmers for them to pay after harvesting 6.
 To be sensitive to market changes i.e. offer reasonable prices depending 7.
with the demand 
 Give them seed to plant and pay after harvest 8.
 Increasing farmers trainings, offering farm inputs on time, increase visits to 9.
the farmers 
 Offering good prices which eliminates the brokers 10.
 
Question 2: How can farmers be trustworthy to Shalem?  
 Signing farming contracts with Shalem 1.
 Agreements on the good quality parameters that are to be used 2.
 Input soft loans to farmers 3.
 Adhering to the agreements 4.
 Supplying quality produce 5.
 Repayment of seed given to farmers after harvest 6.
 
Question 3: What is the worst thing Shalem could do to decrease your 
trust?  
 Failure to meet the agreed upon requirements, i.e. prices, onset timing of 1.
inputs 
 Offering lower prices than those prevailing in the market 2.
 Shalem Investments failing to buy or delays in buying of sorghum from the 3.
farmers 
 Having untrustworthy agents who cheat on prices or weights and 4.
measurements 
 Failure to buy our produce at the agreed prices 5.
 Failing to pay on time after farmers have delivered their produce 6.
 Decreasing or lack of trainings to farmers. 7.
 
In conclusion, the farmers had the following suggestions on the way 
forward; 
 Increase monitoring frequency to farmers by Shalem Investment facilitators 1.
 Increase the number of facilitators per cluster so as to reach more groups 2.
 Collect money for the inputs from groups early enough to be used to 3.
purchase inputs and not waiting for the last minute when farmers have 
used their money on other needs 
 Shalem should not organising meetings on the same days of group 4.
meetings as this leaves a low attendance in group meetings leading to poor 
group participation by members 
 Collective group proposal of inputs purchase; indicating what the group has 5.
and what is needed to fill in the gap and collectively make purchases. 
 Identifying areas with large acres or groups with more production and send 6.
the technical staff to survey the area before the harvest and collection for 
better planning and execution 
 Agents to visit farmers prior to harvesting to assure farmers of buying from 7.
them 
 Increase number of agents to attend to at least all the groups 8.
 Cooperative coordination during collection of the sorghum to ensure all the 9.
aggregated sorghum is collected in a timely manner. 
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Briefing session at Shalem offices: 
From the briefing session with the Shalem team at the Shalem offices the 
following was discussed using the presentation on the agent-based model; 
 The Wageningen Economic Research team presented the agent-based 1.
model – ABM, with some assumptions in mind; i.e. single crop 
 Experience-based trust evolution 2.
 Group trust is lost when group members default - no more loan applications 3.
by the group 
 Processor’s trust in a farmer is lost after repeated defection - no more 4.
contracts for defecting farmers 
 Either independence or negative correlation between natural conditions ( 5.
harvest) and farm gate price 
 
The team was able to understand clearly their role as Shalem and the impact 
of their contributions so far, and a way forward was discussed as below 
 Strategy – Shalem can incorporate the findings of this exercise into their 1.
strategy moving forward 
 Business model- what needs to be reviewed in their current business 2.
model? 
 Inputs/training – How will Shalem further the trainings even beyond 3.
2SCALE support? 
 Model of payment/pre-financing – how can this be improved effectively 4.
(e.g. financing farmers before planting to adequately prepare them for 
planting and repay after harvest? 
 Staff turnover is an issue that needs to be addressed 5.
 The Wageningen Economic Research team will share the updated report 6.
with the team after incorporating the discussed changes/comments. 
In conclusion, the IFDC team held a final meeting with the Shalem 
management and planned the seasons activities based on the approved cluster 
action plan and budget. This activities majorly touching on agronomic trainings 
and capacity buildings were sufficiently aligned to fit in the period running from 
June to November 2017. 
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